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When the American Civil War broke out and cut off the 
chief source of cotton to the European trade, the price of 
cotton rose and merchants and cotton dealers in Bombay were 
given the opportunity of realizing profits previously unheard 
of. These profits as they returned to Bombay, produced a 
plethora of wealth far beyond the requirements of a bona 
fide trade. Therefore an extraordinary means of investment 
became a necessity. People came to possess money for which 
they saw no legitimate vent and so hunted out new schemes in 
which to invest their money. Diverse, bubble concerns 
sprang up and Bombay went mad with the spirit of speculation. 
Shares rose to a price which invariably led to the formation 
of more, and credit was extended and speculation encouraged. 
The Bank of Bombay, chartered in 1840, one of the 
three Presidency Banks of India, played a prominent role in 
fostering this speculation. Under a new charter, Act X of 
1863, which relaxed its previous strict banking code and 
with weak, unknowledgeable officials as managers who had come 
under the corruption of Premchund Roychund, the greatest 
entrepreneur of the island, the bank broke every sound 
principle of business f inance. The Government of India seem-
ingly the protector of the bank, in truth had no effective 
control over the bank's practices. 
The panic which followed the cessation of hostilities 
in America brought about a reaction in prices in Bombay. 
Buyers could no longer be found for shares in the market 
place and soon the new companies were forced to liquidate. 
The Bank of Bombay unfortunately continued to practice unsound 
banking practices, and kept on advancing money on poor 
security. Finally in January 1868 the Bank of Bombay went 
into liquidation. It returned only about one-fiftieth on a 
fully paid share. 
A Royal Commission chosen by Governor General Lawrence 
performed an investigation into the causes of the failure of 
the bank. The report issued by this Commission condemned the 
management of the bank and the unorthodox banking procedures 
granted by the Government Act of 1863, citing the exceptional 
nature of the times which should have caused more vigilance 
on the part of everyone concerned with the bank. 
The new Bank of Bombay, Limited, which was chartered 
shortly thereafter, flourished, profiting by its predecessor's 
example and reverting to a strict charter and wise, experienced 
management. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 
I. FIRST YEARS OF THE BANK OF BOMBAY ! BACKGROUND 
AND CHARTERS OF 1840 AND 1863 
II. THE SPECULATION MANIA IN BOMBAY: THE BANK OF 
BOMBAY INSTITUTES DANGEROUS PRACTICES 
(1863-1865) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
III. THE COMMERCIAL CRISIS: THE BEGINNING OF 
THE END (18 65-1866) . . . . . . . 
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE BANK OF BOMBAY AND AFTER-
MATH (1866-1868) 
V. CONCLUSION . . . . 
VI. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 
PAGE 
l 






FIRST YEARS OF THE BANK OF BOMBAY: 
BACKGROUND AND CHARTERS OF 
1840 AND 1863 
A well-known Liverpool merchant visiting Bombay in 
January, 1863 wrote of the striking changes which had taken 
place since his last visit. He noted the presence of 
tall chimneys with dense volumes of black smoke issuing 
from them, reminding one of our own manufacturing towns 
in England. . . there are already nine mills at work 
or in process of erection on this island, and there is 
little doubt but that the manufacturing interest has 
got a permanent impulse and will continue rapidly to 
advance. Bombay is just now beginning to make great 
strides in commercial progress and you may rely upon it, 
it is destined to become the emporium of the East.l 
During the whole of the British period Bombay was, with Cal-
cutta, one of the two largest and most important cities in 
India. Bounded within the confines of a long, narrow island, 
Bombay is extremely picturesque, facing the sea with the 
magnificent Western Ghats Mountains towering in the back-
ground. Bombay had the finest natural harbor in India and was 
the nearest port of call for the traffic of the Indian Ocean 
1 
London Times, February 16, 1863, p. 5, col. 6. 
1 
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as well as for trade with Europe and Asia. The expansion of 
trade during the first half of the nineteenth century resulted 
in the multiplication of the island's commercial facilities. 
A group of English and Indian merchants established a Chamber 
of Commerce in 1836 and joint-stock banks gradually replaced 
the old system of agency houses for banking, the first being 
established in 1840. 
Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay from 1854 to 
1860, upon leaving his post, commented on the rapid growth of 
Bombay trade: 
This rapid extension of commercial enterprise is, I 
am happy to think, not owing to wild speculation or to 
any other temporary and fortuitous cause. It is chiefly 
owing, I believe, to the steadily increasing demand for 
European manufactures in this country and to the growth 
of a corresponding demand for our exports in Europe. 
The extension of railways and the gradual improvement 
of our internal communications, must have an important 
influence on the development of our trade.2 
Until 1860 the progress of the trade of Bombay had been a 
sober, steady evolution advancing with the growth of rail-
ways and communications. But the great growth and change of 
Bombay which the Liverpool merchant noted in 1863 was due to 
a novel factor--the American Civil War. The blockading of 
the southern ports and the cessation of American cotton 
2 D. E. Wacha, Premchund Roychund (Bombay, 1913), pp. 
25-26. 
3 
exports, forced the European textile industries to depend on 
Indian cotton. This led to an expansion of trade which brought 
large sums of money into Bombay, money which could not all be 
employed and so triggered a mighty specul ation which engulfed 
public officials as well as peasants. As one journalist put 
it, India, which had long been an out-of-the-way uncommercial 
country, had now become an in-the-way commercial country. 3 
As the importance of Bombay grew in the area of com-
merce and trade, so did the need for an adequate banking 
system. When English traders first came to India in the 
seventeenth century they could not make much use of indigenous 
banking establishments owing to their ignorance of the latter's 
language and owing to the Indian inexperience in matters of 
trade. Therefore the Agency Houses which British companies 
had established to conduct commercial affairs began also to 
conduct banking business. The Agency Houses in Calcutta and 
Bombay served as bankers for the East India Company, the 
members of the services, and the European merchants in India. 
Some banks were chartered by the East India Company, but none 
lasted more than a few years. They were followed by banks 
established under Acts of the Indian legislature. These 
consisted of two types, the first consisting of three 
3Economist, May 13, 1865, p. 558. 
Presidency Banks, and the second of the Indian Joint-Stock 
Banks. 
4 
The Banks of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, known as the 
Presidency Banks were established in 1800, 1840, and 1843 
respectively. The Bank of Bombay was established after much 
difficulty--for it took three years of negotiations to pass 
the charter of 1840. The Bank of Bombay was incorporated 
with a capital of 52 1/4 lakhs (1 525,000). This capital was 
increased to some 209 lakhs by 1864, then in January 1867 it 
was reduced to 104 1/2 lakhs. The Bank went into liquidation 
in January, 1868. A discussion of the rise and fall of the 
Bank of Bombay is the subject of this paper. 
On December 26, 1836, encouraged by the extension of 
Bombay commerce, a public meeting was held in the office of 
John Skinner and Company which adopted a prospectus for a 
bank for the Presidency of Bombay. It appointed a committee 
to secure a Charter for the bank. It was agreed that the 
charter should be modelled after the charter of the Bank of 
Bengal. Within a month of this meeting applications for 
shares were received for nearly double the agreed capital of 
30 lakhs. The capital was then raised to 50 lakhs with the 
sanction of the Bombay Government which had also approved the 
request for a charter. Two forms of a charter were prepared, 
one providing for the holding of shares by the East India· 
5 
Company and the other omitting this provision. Both charters 
were dispatc hed to England in January 1837 with the opening 
of t he bank being deferred until one of the charters should be 
returned with the confirmation of the Court of Directors of 
the East India Company. A great delay ensued. The project 
was stoutly opposed by certain Bombay capitalists who had 
hitherto enjoyed a practical monopoly of banking, and in 
addition since the Government of India was at the same time 
considering a scheme for a Bank of India, the Court of 
Directors declined to deal with the Bombay proposals until an 
answer had been received from India on the larger question. 
These questions were resolved in December 1838 and an Act of 
Incorporation was sanctioned by the Court ~r Directors. The 
Government of India however refused to recognize this Act of 
Incorporation. The Bank of Bombay appealed this decision to 
the Indian government and eventually won. 
On February 17, 1840, Act III of 1840 constituting 
the Bank of Bombay was passed by the Government of India. 
The Bank opened its doors on April 15, 1840 with a capital 
of 52 1/4 lakhs, including 3 lakhs subscribed by the Bombay 
Government. Three of its nine directors were nominees of 
this Government. The Bank enjoyed the privileges of note 
issue, the maximum limit of which was fixed at 2 crores, and 
the smallest denomination of notes issued being Rs 10. For 
6 
some twenty years the Bank of Bombay prospered under prudent 
management; it paid good dividends to its shareholders and 
never incurred great losses. It adhered strictly to the 
rules of its charter. In November 1848 it faced a short panic 
caused by a few forged notes being put into circulation. 
Payment of these notes was refused by the Bank. 
In 1860 a Government Paper Currency Office was 
established and by Act XIX of 1861 (took effect March 1, 1862) 
the Bank of Bombay was no longer to enjoy the privilege of 
issuing bank notes. In 1861 the Bank's board of directors 
determined in consequence of the new arrangements for note 
issue, to prepare an Act similar to that of the Bank of Bengal 
in 1857. In 1857 the directors of the Bank of Bengal had 
given the government notice of their impending infringement 
of the terms of their charter. No longer would they be under 
the mechanical checks of the government and the minimum cash 
reserves clause would be disregarded. The government, which 
had taken little interest in the bank up to this point, did 
not choose to intervene. And so now the Bank of Bombay also 
prepared to ask for a relaxation of the strict rules of 
business and an increase of the Bank's capital to 210 lakhs. 
This Act, passed by the Indian Government as Act X of 1863 
differed greatly from Act III of 1840. The situation in 
Bombay in 1863 differed greatly from that of 1840, and this 
7 
new charter along with the brisk economic activity in Bombay 
in 1863 in consequence of the American Civil War were the 
prelude to disaster for the Bank of Bombay. 
The history of cotton cultivation in India is a long 
one, but until the nineteenth century the export of raw cotton 
was a rare occurrence. Before the nineteenth century India 
was chiefly famous for exporting e l egant fabrics to Europe, 
but inventions of machinery for spinning and weaving and the 
consequent competition of cheap goods had considerably dimin-
ished the markets for such elegant fabrics. But at the same 
time the possibility was revealed for India as a supplier of 
raw cotton. By 1830 America was the principal supplier of raw 
cotton to the growing English industry. The main reasons for 
this were that American cotton was cleaner and had longer 
staple than Indian cotton, also that difficulties of communica-
tions and lack of a stable export market in India posed 
problems. Workers as well as employers preferred the American 
cotton--there was 20-25 per cent wastage with Indian compared 
to 10 per cent for American and the short stapled Indian 
cotton had to be twisted harder (12 turns per inch, while 
American needed only 8). Thus a machine would produce 10-20 
4 per cent more yarn from American cotton. However at times 
4A. Silver, Manchester Men and Indian Cotton (Ma n-
chester, 1966), pp. 294-295. 
8 
the European textile markets were forced to buy Indian cotton 
when American suppliers were unable to keep up with their 
growing demands, or when American prices were deemed too high. 
The commencement of a cotton spinning and weaving 
industry in Bombay also dates from the mid-nineteenth century. 
In 1850 even the model of a cotton mill could not 
have been found in Bombay; but shortly afterwards the 
enormous imports of piece-goods and yarns from Lanca-
shire set the merchant community wondering whether it 
might not be feasible to fight Manchester with her own 
weapons and themselves supply the demands of the island 
and the Presidency.5 
In 1854 the first mill, the Bombay Spinning and Weaving 
Company began operations. By 1861 there were a total of six 
mills operating in Bombay with a total of 90,500 spindles and 
240 looms. Manchester's alarm at the possibility of Indian 
competition was quite unjustified as this compared to some 
33,000,000 spindles operating in England at this time. 6 But 
though in comparison to England, Bombay's cotton industry 
was small, yet the economic impetus it provided attracted 
a considerable industrial population to the island. 
Among those responsible for the growth and development 
of the mill industry in Bombay, were the Parsees. An 
5 S. M. Edwardes, Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island 
(Bombay, 1909), II, pp. 153-154. 
6 ' 1 Si ver, ~2.· c it., p. 308. 
9 
enterprising commercial people, the Parsees had migrated to 
India from Persia in the eighth century. They settled on the 
western coast of India north of Bombay, in the territory of 
Gujerat. They were culturally distinct as fire-worshiping 
followers of Zoroaster. They never identified themselves 
with any Indian group; they maintained a close-knit, yet 
progressive group and thus avoided submersion into the Indian 
population. Their light complexions, tall stature, and 
acquiline features, the Europeans found very agreeable. When 
European traders first began to appear in India, the Parsees 
were quick to learn the business and act as brokers for the 
importers. Then too they began to engage in business on their 
own account, especially in the area of raw cotton, yarn, and 
cloth. The cotton mills in Bombay were the chief area of 
Parsee activity. In trade however the Parsees ranked second 
to the Europeans and the influence of Jews and Hindus is not 
to be discounted. 
On April 12, 1861 the Southern states of America opened 
the Civil War by firing upon Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, 
South Carolina. This war brought to Bombay city in particular, 
and to the Bombay Presidency in general a period of buoyant 
prosperity and accelerated the growth of the mill industry. 
The effects of the creation of a sudden demand for Indian 
cotton were t r uly enormous. The government of Bombay, led 
10 
by the very able Sir Henry Bartle Frere exerted itself vigor-
ously by appointing cotton commissioners to aid cultivation 
and check quality, and by pushing forward construction of 
roads and railroads to facilitate the movement of cotton to 
Bombay Harbor for shipment to England. The cotton cultivators 
and dealers quickly real ized large profits for their crops. 7 
As Lancashire cried for cotton, Indian warehouses rid themselves 
7D. R. Gadgil, The Industrial Evolution of India in 
Recent Times (London, 1944), p. 16. 
Price of Indian cotton in annas per pound 
1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 
2-7 3-7 4-2 6-4 10-5 11-5 7-1 6-2 
Gadgil, ~- cit., p. 16. 
Imports of raw cotton in UK from Indi a (in bal e s) 
1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 
509,695 562,738 986,280 1,071,768 1,229,984 1,399,514 1,266,513 
Robert Hogarth Patterson, 
October 1864, p. 498. 
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of old and probably damaged stock, and "all the rubbish that 
could be got together and screwed into bales, including even, 
it is said, the wadding of furniture, quilts and cloaks [were] 
shipped to England. 118 
The period of the American Civil War was known as the 
cotton famine of Lancashire. But in fact in a way it was a 
good thing for the manufacturing district and probably saved 
the trade from ruin. In anticipation of the outbreak of the 
American War there had been overproduction in 1859-1860 and 
the cotton famine now allowed this surplus to be drained off. 
There was g reat suffering among the mill employees in Lanca-
shire especially during 1862;
9 
a group of Bombay merchants sent 
8Mangles, "The Progress of India," Edinburgh Review, 
CXIX, 1864, p. 111. 
9The London Times of September 26, 1863, p. 6, col. 4, 
gave the following chart of the number of paupers by cotton 
manufacturing union (per 1,000). 
[Partial Listing] 
Union Michaelmas Quarter Maximum Week Last Week 
1861 Dec. 1862 Aug. 1863 
Haslingden 853 11,504 3,865 
Ashton-under 
Lyne 1,758 35,080 19,187 
Burnley 1,356 8,812 3,001 
Rochdale 1,995 14,027 6,214 
Blackburn 2,720 24,067 6,825 
Manchester-
township 5,974 41,692 17,391 
12 
money to aid that distressed community but the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce remarked, "It was not charity they wanted 
10 but uotton." By 1863 the raw cotton reaching the Liverpool 
market began to supply adequately the industry's needs. From 
1863 to the cessation of the Civil War in 1865 there were 
periodic slowdowns in the cotton market as cotton dealers in 
Liverpool hearing of the continued successes of the Federal 
armies felt the war would soon end. An article in the 
Economist of April 15, 1865 warned that by anticipating the 
war's end, England may fall very short of cotton and even 
after the end of the war there would be at the very least a 
period of fourteen months until shipments from the south would 
be forthcoming. He commented further: 
Sooner or later, no doubt, as we have always said, 
the United States will beat all other cotton growing 
countries out of the market, with the exception of 
moderate special qualities from Bombay, Egypt, and 
Brazil--but it will be later and not sooner, and we 
need not augment the catastrophe by anticipating it.
11 
While England was cautiously awaiting the end of the 
war, Bombay ignored all warning. While Lancashire suffered 
for lack of money, Bombay suffered for lack of sound inveptment 
l0Arthur Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, 
Vol. II (Manchester, 1956), p. 15. 
11Economist, April 15, 1965, P· 430. 
13 
for money. So tremendous was the demand for cotton, so high 
the range of price and so vast the profit from it, that an 
economic disturbance literally overtook Bombay. Money seemed 
to lose its purchasing power as prices of goods as well as 
wages of laborers rose. 
The economic history of most commercial countries 
had shewn that when money in vast quantities seeks 
for and fails to find sound investments, it will be 
wasted. The wastage takes the form of unwise or insane 
speculation. It was to such speculation that Bombay 
fell a victim during these years.12 
The Bank of Bombay played an important role in the general 
demoralization which overtook the Presidency. The alterations 
to its charter by Act X of 1863 had but opened the door to 
unorthodox banking practices. Worse deeds were to follow. 
The Annual Report of the Bombay Government of 1862-1863 
included the following statement regarding the reconstitution 
of the Bank of Bombay passed as Act X of 1863: 
The object of the present bill is to grant to the 
Bank a new charter of incorporation, similar in most 
respects to the old one, but adapted to the change in 
the business and to the a ltered circumstances of the 
Bank, consequent upon the withdrawal in pursuance of 
Act XIX of 1 861, of the privilege to issue Bank Notes 
payable to bearer on demand, and upon the transfer of 
the Bombay Ge neral Treasury to the Bank and the 
acceptance by the Bank of an agency of issue, payment, 
and exchange of the Government Notes, payable under the 
Currency Act, in accordance with the provisions of_ Act 
12 
Edwardes, Gazetteer,~- cit., II, p. 164. 
14 
XXIV of 1861. 13 
The report missed the real significance and impact of 
the new bank charter. This was its alteration from a charter 
insisting on caution and security, to one which allowed more 
latitude to the directors and officers, latitude which could 
be misused. Among the main points of difference between 
Act III of 1840 and Act X of 1863 were that while the former 
Act prohibited the discount of negotiable securities unless 
two persons or firms unconnected by partnership were bound 
by such security; the later Act allowed the discount of any 
negotiable security. Act III had prohibited any advance on 
bank shares or any certificate of shares; Act X allowed 
advances on the security of shares in public companies in 
India and did not require that all the calls on such shares 
should be paid up or prohibit advances on the premia of 
shares. The new Act allowed an advance to any one firm for 
a larger amount than 3 lakhs and for a longer period than 
three months; this had been prohibited under the old Act. In 
addition, Act x of 1863 allowed advances on all goods and 
merchandise whether perishable or not, it contained no 
definite provision against overdrafts of acc ounts nor a 
13 d · · · f Annual Report of the A ministration~ the Bombay 
Pr e sidency for the Year 1862 - 1862 (Bombay, 1863?), p. 112. 
15 
provision prohibiting any discount or loan unless the cash in 
the bank equalled one-forth of all the claims outstanding 
against it at the time. Act III had included provisions 
against such practices. Also Act X empowered the proprietors 
to increase the capital at a special general meeting to not 
over two crores and 10 lakhs. 
This act was passed by the Bombay l egislative council 
on March 24, 1863 and was assented to by the Governor-General 
on July 4, 1863. Act X went into effect on August 1, 1863. 
The passing of the Act was immediately followed by the 
increase of the bank's capital. At a special general meeting 
held on September 21, 1863 it was resolved to double the 
capital by the issue of 5,225 new shares of 1,000 rupees 
each. This was the start of the first of the four main 
periods leading to the bank's ruin as delineated by the Royal 
Commission which later investigated the causes of the bank's 
failure. 
This first period of the bank 's histo ry from August 1, 
1863 to June 1, 1864 was significant in that the bank's 
directors failed to move at this point to provide for the 
safe working of the new Act. In the forming of the new Act a 
certain Schedule B which contained the proposed byelaws for 
the bank had been omitted. Instead, a clause, section 45, 
had been inserted which enabled the bank's directors to pass 
16 
byelaws with the sanction of the Governor in Council. But 
the directors neglected to prepare any byelaws and the bank 
operated without any code to regulate its practice or to 
define the duties or powers of either the directors of the 
14 
secretary. The directors during this period were Mr. Birch, 
a Government director, President, Messrs Gavin Steel, R. 
Mac Ilwraith, J. A. Baumbach, George Foggo, F. F. Lidderdale, 
M. H. Scott, Limjee Manockjee, Rustomjee Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy 
and Cowasjee Jehangeer, Commercial Directors, and Messrs. 
A. D. Robertson, G. Inverarity and H. A. Mangles, Government 
Directors. These directors are open to great blame, for the 
bank's secretary, Mr. J ames Blair and the deputy secretary 
Mr. Ryland, determined to avail themselves of the powers which 
the new act conferred. Mr. Blair found much opportunity to 
launch a radical change in the practice of the bank as to 
cash credits. Instead of insisting on the former practice 
which required Government paper (guaranteed railway shares or 
bullion) to be deposited as security for cash cre dits, Mr. 
Bl a ir began to grant advances on personal security alone .. 
14According to a resolution of August 6, 1863 (in 
e ffect until May 4, 1865) passed by the directors. "Re solve d 
that for the present and until further orders, any a pplications 
for advances on any bank shares, on any public company othe r 
than Government banks, be submitted to the board, and not ma d e 
by the secretary." Commission Report,~ cit., p. 6 . 
17 
A promi~ory note signed by one borrower or by joint borrowers 
was deemed sufficient. 
During the Royal Commission's questioning of Premchund 
Roychund, a financial speculator and wheeler-dealer par 
excellence, some of Blair ' s dealings were revealed. Roychund 
stated that many of his associates were hesitant to have their 
names brought up before the directors of the bank in order to 
procure loans, and consequentl y he had suggested to Blair that 
if the bank would grant l oans upon personal security he would 
get plenty of applicants to come forward to take loans. 15 
Blair liked this idea and though apparently telling Roychund 
that he would consu l t with the directors on this matter , he 
bypassed this step and began the practice of advancing credit 
on personal security. Coincidently Premchund Roychund and his 
fat.her Roychund Deepchund were the first to receive cash credit 
under this new system . Roychund told his friends about this 
method and even received from Blair a book of blank forms of 
promissory notes for obtaining such loans! 
Not only did Blair not ask the directors about such 
cash credi ts, he also failed to enter them in the application 
book which was laid before the directors at the weekly board 
meetings. Joseph Maria De Ga, the ledger-keeper at the·Bank 
15c . . R t ommission epor , op. cit., India minutes, p. 4. 
18 
of Bombay, under testimony to the Commission stated that, ''all 
applications for cash credits on personal security were 
omitted from this book by order of Mr. Blair. 1116 Instead , De 
Ga kept a small memorandum book which only the secretary had 
access to, and in which De Ga entered such cash credits. 
Blair, whose testimony the Commission declared to be "far 
from satisfactory," at first denied any knowledge of this 
credit, then admitted that he must have acted upon the 
h d . 17 authority of one oft e irectors. The Commission failed 
to find that this was the case. The directors themselves had 
no reason to suspect that the secretary was keeping a 
separate ledger. 
Another change in banking practices which Blair began 
was to discount promissory notes signed by a single borrower, 
without taking additional security. Under testimony all of 
the directors, with one exception, denied knowledge of this 
practice. Mr. Mangles, a Government director said that he 
had found out about this practice in 1864. 
investigation as follows: 
He described his 
I wrote a letter to the secretary and asked him 
whether he was in the habit of discounting promissory 
notes only, as it seemed to me to be a violation of 
the charter. He wrote back, saying that it was a hard 
16c . . R t ommission epor, ~- cit., Summary, p. 7. 
17rbid., p. 8. 
19 
term to use, b ut t ha t the boa r d of directors considered 
that they could do it under the charter. I then wrote a 
private note to Mr. A. D. Rober t son r who was then one of 
the directors, and he said thal he thought that it 
could be done unde r the char t r . I then went to Mr . 
Birch and aske d him wh e the r he was aware of it , and he 
said that he was; a n d I asked und what clause of the 
charter it could be d o ne . He said as a cas h credit . 
I said that I did not agree with hi n . I then wrote to 
Mr. Lidderdal e a nd a s ked him whethc :, as a mercantile 
man, he could con s cie nti ously sane Lon that kind of 
cash credit. He wrote back, and s<.1 Ld no, certainly not , 
but that it was the cus t om of the b ank to disco unt bills 
of that s or t . 18 
Upon requestionins tne me n whom Mangles mentioned in his 
statement, the Commis s i o n d iscovered that Birch could not 
recollect the tra n s a c ti o n and Robertson appeared to have mis-
understood it. 
Blair instituted ye t another cllauge in bank practice. 
Under the former c h a rte r the bank had kept a freq uently 
revised discount list, s h owing the amouHt of credit which 
could safely b e a dva n ced to differenl commercial men in Bombay. 
After 1863 the bank no l onger kept this list. Blair also 
discontinued the p roce du re of referriny all questions as to 
how much credit shoul d b e a l lowed Lo aµ~ licants to the 
directors at the ir weekly meeting. Blc1i r excused this by 
saying that the q ues ti onn aires had b en continually returned 
to him with the r eq ues t that he refer to a native director 
and so he from thi s po int con ferred wiLh only one native 
director , who, at fir s t, was owasjec J~hangeer. 
' ~-
20 
In the subsequent testimony before the Royal Commis-
sion the directors were asked about their ommission to set up 
byelaws. Typically Mr. Foggo stated that he was unaware that 
the Schedule B had been struck out but added that no doubt 
there should have been byelaws. He said that he knew of no 
applications for a cash credit on personal security only.
1
9 
Furthermore, there was no statement defining what the powers 
of the secretary were and though some directors did, from 
time to time consider that there should be a letter of defini-
tion written, along with byelaws, other business seemed to 
be more pressing and so they neglected to take action. The 
Commission found the directors at fault in thinking that the 
bank's business could be carried out legally, without byelaws. 
But the secretary was even more at fault. Section 27 of Act 
X had authorized the secretary to endorse and execute trans-
fers, and to draw, accept, and endorse bills, promissory notes, 
and letters of credit, and to sign other documents on behalf 
of the bank, and so dispensed with the seal of the bank, or 
the signature of the directors to such documents, and made 
the signature of the secretary valid for the purpose of 
binding the bank. But no section of Act X empowered the · 
l<l · · . t d Report of the Commissioners Appo~n e to Inquire 
into the Failureof the Bank of Bombay, minutes taken in 
y-- -- -- -- - -ndia, p. 7. 
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secretary to lend money on his own authority. The Commission 
suggested that it should have been up to the secretary to 
see that his own duties were more clearly defined and also as 
secretary he should have reminded the directors that they had 
neglected to pass any byelaws. 
Along with this change in the rules of the bank there 
also was a change in the economic atmosphere of the city of 
Bombay. Daily, more and more capital was flowing into the 
Presidency. An examination of the reaction of the Government 
to this new situation is quite revealing in that like the 
bank's directors, it failed to interfere when it should have. 
CHAPTER II 
THE SPECULATION MANIA IN BOMBAY: THE BANK OF BOMBAY 
INSTITUTES DANGEROUS PRACTICES (1863-1865) 
The commercial crisis was one of the dominating factors 
of the governorship (1862-1867) of Sir Henry Bartle Frere. 
Formerly an assistant to Lord Canning at Calcutta, Frere was 
appointed Governor of Bombay in March 1862 by the Indian 
Secretary, Sir Charles Wood, succeeding Sir George Clerk who 
had resigned because of ill health. A tall, slender man, 
Frere had a soft voice and spoke c l early, yet deliberately--
tt the great charm of his presence lay in the expression of his 
open countenance and sweet and ready smile ... in his abso-
1 lute self-forgetfulness and ready sympathy." Frere was a man 
of much initiative and he determined to do great things for 
Bombay, but in the end the commercial crisis and the subordi-
nation of his power to the central government at Calcutta 
hampered his every move. 
The Bombay Governor and his three man council were 
appointed directly by the Crown. The Council was compris e d 
of a commander-in-chief of the Presidency whose duties were 
confined chiefly to military matters, and two civil members, 
--------- - - - --
l John Martineau, The Life and Correspondence of Sir 
Bartle Frere (London, 1895), I, p. 130. 
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one who dealt with revenue and finance, and the other who 
handled judicial affairs. Generally each member transacted 
the business of his department separately with the Governor. 
Frere, being interested especially in public works, took this 
department under his personal direction. Before the days of 
railroad and telegraph communications it was practically 
impossible for Calcutta to oversee Bombay's every action. 
Thus in most matters Bombay officials would act first and 
ask for approval later. During Lord Dalhousie's administra-
tion (1848-1855) however, a policy began to develop which 
tended to curtail any independent action by the Presidencies. 
As the problems of administration grew in India, so did this 
trend towards more centra li zation. Frere did not like this 
centralization. His conflict with Calcutta accelerated, when 
in December, 1863, Sir John Lawrence was appointed Viceroy. 
A centralizer by conviction, Lawrence held firmly that 
only a centralized system would maintain the Empire intact, 
and so he set himself to follow the lines of consolidation 
begun by Lord Dalhousie. Too, Lawrence had had a distinguished 
career as an Indian civil servant but the interests of the 
Punjab and the Northwestern Provinces which he knew, far out-
weighed his interests in the rest of India. Frere soon dis-
covered that not only did this system check his actions, but 
that Lawrence really had little appreciation for the problems 
24 
of Bombay. Then too Frere and Lawrence differed as to fiscal 
policy. Lawrence wrote about this: 
Our financial prospects are very gloomy indeed. 
The furore for expenditure is excessive. A con-
siderable sum must be laid out in building new barracks 
and improving the old ones. But the tendancy is to 
overdo the matter. I would limit this, if I could hope 
for any support, but this I do not see. Sir Hugh Rose 
and Napier have no regard for financial considerations 
and Frere is worse than anybody. 2 
A biographer of Lawrence comments that " . Lawrence 
thought he was bound to be just before he was genero us and to 
look before he leaped. Sir Bartle Frere too often leaped 
before he looked; and sometimes it may have been to the 
advantage of India that he did so. 113 Frere had been quick to 
recognize that the unprecedented demand for Indian cotton 
created by the American Civil War and the stimulus it gave 
to the production of cotton in India, if regulated and con-
trolled would be wholly advantageous to the Presioency. Frere 
saw that prompt and effective measures rnust be taken to enable 
the ryots and merchants to meet to the fullest extent possible 
this sudden demand for cotton. Not only must production be 
increased, but the type of cotton produced must be changed to 
2 Raman Das Basu, India Under the British Crown (Cal-
cu t t..a, 19 3 3) , p. 8 3. 
3 Reginald Bosworth Smith, Li fe ot Lord Lawrence (New 
York, 1883), II, p. 378. 
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meet the requirements of the English spinners, and transpor-
tation from the inland districts to the wharves must be 
improved upon. 
It was hoped that the needed improvements in the type 
of cotton exported was secured by handing out instructions to 
the cultivators on how to raise a more efficient crop and by 
imposing harsh penalties (Cotton Frauds Act, 1863) on those 
convicted of adulterating cotton bales. Frere upheld his 
action explaining that it made it possible for the merchant 




A letter published in the London Times on July 28, 1863 
from a member of the House of Commons underlined Frere's 
points on a broader scale: 
. one point I will venture to urge upon the atten-
tion of the Indian government. If the American troubles 
shoul6 happily cease during the year, and we get some 
cotton from the United States, and increased supplies 
from other countries also, then our Indian imports of 
cotton would realize to the holders -1 10,000,000 sterling 
less in value in 1863-4, and very probably some Indian 
s e cretary would have to assi~n as a rea~on f or a falling 
revenue that Lancashire, as in former times, would not 
take, because she could supply herself elsewhere with 
good cotton, rubbish from India. At all events, I do 
not think a revenue based largely on opium, salt, and 
practically monopoly prices for.cotton ou~ht to be 
relied upon as a stable one. Withou~ ~aying myself to 
the charge of renewed unsound propositions on beha~f of 
4william Basil Worsfold, Sir Bartle Frere (London, 
1923), p. 34. 
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Lancashire, I venture simply to suggest that it might be 
prudent and sound policy for a Government like that of 
India descended from a trading company and as yet a 
trading one, dealing in opium and farming other sorts 
of produce, to aid or persuade, if you like, its own 
tenant cotton-growers to produce a better quality of the 
commodity upon which so large a share of its revenue is 
evidently dependent. I don't know that we, the cotton 
interest, have really done more than this heretofore I . , 
venture again to repeat the suggestion, still thinking 
it sound and economic advice.5 
Along with the abnormal demand for cotton, Bombay 
experienced an abnormal need for roads, railroads and canals. 
Frere himself said that "the question of a vastly increased 
supply of cotton from Western India was almost everywhere a 
. d "6 question of roa s. But it was difficult to obtain the 
necessary funds from Calcutta to build the roads, and there 
was much red tape from Whitehnll as well. A Whig aristocrat 
and experienced minister, Sir Charles Wood led an able admini s -
tration as Indian secretary for seven years (June 1859-
February 1 866) . But Wood, as Lawrence, was a cautious man in 
financial mntters and "a somewhat unconstructive reformer he 
reflected in exaggerated form the limiLations of the Imperial 
viewpoint in the min-nineteenth century."
7 
5Times, July 28, 1863, p. 12, col. 5. 
6worsfold, ~- cit., P· 34. 
7Robin James Moore, Sir Charles Wood's Indian Policy 
1853-66 (Manchester, J.966) ,P. 254. 
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The East Indi a Company \•!hich rul <.l India until 1858 
had been remi ss in i t s a tte nt ion to publi c works. Following 
an unfortunate poli cy of ne glect knowin that most Britons 
considered India only as some whe r e east of Suez, the company 
did as little as decency permitted in this direction. 8 In 
1853 Lord Da lhousie liad written: 
Great trac t s are t eemin g with produce they cannot 
dispose of. [and ] Eng l and i s cc1ll i n g a l o u d for 
the cotton which India does already p rodu ce in some 
degree and would produce suffici nt in q u a l ity and 
plentiful in quant ity if only there wa re provided the 
f i tting means of conveyanc e for i 9 
Dalhousie recommended a comprehen sive system of railways and 
got approval in 18 53 for bui l ding ext~nsions on to the few 
e xisting lines. Unfortunately thi s was or l y a small start. 
At a mee ti ng uf the Manchester Ch c:rn1ber of Commerce in 
January 1861 its president expressed c1la.rP, over the inevi t a -
bility of the American Civil War . lle echced others ' b e lief 
that while the manufacturers' f uture depended on Indi a n 
cotton, the main obstacle to its increuscd import '' l ay in the 
defective and expensive mod e ot transpor . 11 1 0 They urged.Wood 
8Le land Hamil ton Jenks, :!:_he Mig t·a. Lion of British 
Capital to 187 5 (London, 1927), p . 209 . 
9Ibid., p . 2 11. 
10 Moore , ~ - cit . , p. 13 8 . 
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to borrow money to build railroads and in June he announced: 
Those [railways] which we have determined on pushing 
forward with uptmost dis~atch. . are lines which in the 
present crisis in America must be looked to with the 
greatest interest. One pierces the cotton district [the 
Great Indian Peninsular Line] and the other skirts its 
every edge [the Bombay and Baroda]. The only delay which 
will ar i se will be occasioned by the natural obstacles 
that present themselves.11 
Indeed these natural obstacles were great, for at a distance 
of only forty miles from Bombay rise the Western Ghats Moun-
tains and their surrounding hills which stretch hundreds of 
miles from north to south. But nevertheless work began, due 
mainly to this influence of Manchester on Wood and the vigor 
which Frere aimed towards improving Bombay's commerce. Un-
fortunately this work started at precisely the wrong mome nt, 
for it got caught up in the same speculative mania which 
later wrecked the Bank of Bombay. 
The Back Bay Reclamation Company which later gained 
much notoriety, equal to tha t awarded the Bank of Bombay, had 
its origin in the need by the Bombay and Baroda Railroad of 
land on which to build its terminal. An Indian terminal 
railway station required a great amount of land. Because of 
the rainy season a large proportion of traffic had to be 
11 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CLXIII, June 
3, 1861, p. 493. 
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handled in a short period of time, and due to the tropical 
climate, more space had to be allotted for air circulation. 
In face of the increase in the cotton trade, the Bombay and 
Baroda Railway Company was too busily engaged in connecting 
missing gaps to construct this terminus. The railway company 
pressed the Bombay Government into constructing the terminus. 
By this time however, with the influx of silver from the 
cotton trade the cost of labor as well as land had risen to 
enormous heights in Bombay. The Government which had guaranteed 
to p r ovide the railroad with the needed land, was now quite 
indisposed to pay the fabulous price the times now required. 
Facing such a dilemma it was decided to route the railroad 
over land to be reclaimed from the shallow waters of the Back 
Bay area of Bombay and to build its terminal there. Concession 
was given to a group of Bombay merchants, the Back Bay Recla-
mation Company, who after reclaiming the land and giving the 
Government the acreage required for the railroad, would make 
its profit from sale of the remainder of the reclaimed land. 
This project was on the western part of the island from Colaba 
to the foot of Malabar Hill. As originally presented, the 
Government was to be allotted four hundred shares of J soo 
each in this company, and be part manager of it. But though 
John Lawrence approved this outlay, Charles Wood became 
apprehensive and refused to concur. When, conside ring the. 
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interests of all of India as he had to do, he probably 
concluded correctly that it would be unwise for the Govern-
ment to be involved in such a scheme. Then too he was only 
following his belief that public works did not seem to be 
remunerative and that "railways and roads improve the country 
b t 
.,12 
u do very little for revenue. And so the Back Bay 
Reclamation Company was left without Government participation 
or more importantly, Government control. The shares which had 
been set aside for Governmental purchase now sold for £ 2,650 
each, a 500 per cent increase. A great stimulus was thus 
given to the growing mania for speculation in Bombay at the 
time when it needed to be checked; the second period (June 
1864-April 1865) in the narrative of the failure of the Bank 
of Bombay had begun. 
Railroads were not the only area in which Frere presse d 
for improvement. Bombay under his governorship entered upon 
an Augustan age, in fact it is said he had the ambition to 
13 
leave Bombay a city of marble. Well he might have succeeded 
but for the commercial and financial crisis. Fre r e did l e ve l 
many of the older areas of the city, embark upon the construction 
1 2Moore, ~- cit., P· 1 49 . 
13oinshah Edulge wacha, ~ Financial Chapte r in the 
!!_istory of Bombay City (Bombay , 1910), P· 5. 
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of public buildings and urban improvements such as wider 
streets and sanitation facilities. But indeed just as Wood 
was perhaps too inclined towards economy, Frere was perhaps 
too liberal in his spending habits. To embark upon a period 
of feverish government spending just as wages and material 
costs were rising was not a sound idea. The launching of 
such a large public works improvement program only aggravated 
the situation and when the crash came the government suffered 
discredit along with the bubble companies. But Frere did 
transform Bombay from a merca ntile town into a splendid and 
populous city and modern Bombay is said to date from his 
d 
. . . 14 
a ministration. 
Just how tremendous the economic activity was in Bombay 
is reflected in the results of a census initiated in 1864 by 
Frere. This census recorded a total population for Bombay of 
816,562. Though perhaps a slightly inflated figur e , never-
theless the influx into Bombay during the cotton crisis was 
14 Reclamation projects such as the Back Bay Reclama-
tion Company on the west, and other companies on the east of 
the island, begun under Frere's administration hoped to remedy 
such conditions as had been described by a traveller to Bombay 
in 1845; "all round the Island of Bombay was one foul cesspool, 
sewers discharging on the sands, rocks used only for purposes 
of nature. To ride home to Malabar Hill along the Sands of 
Back Bay was to encounter sights and odors too horribl e to 
describe. . . . " Stephen Meredyth Edwardes, The Gazetteer 




In 1842 the island was inhabited by "about 200,000 
persons increased by a floating population of 70,000 seamen, 
merchants, pilgrims and peasants. Nearly two thirds of the 
population are Hindus, about 20,000 are Parsees and the 
remainder Musalmans, Jews, and Portuguese Christians. 1115 
In 1849 another study proclaimed the residents of Bombay to 
16 number nearly 500,000. An accurate measure of how many of 
the 816,562 number recorded in 1864 were there because of the 
cotton crisis may be seen when in 1872 another census showed 
. 17 
that the population had decreased to 644,405. 
This abnormal influx of people into Bombay at a time 
When more money was pouring into the island than could be 
used in legitimate means of investment created a text book 
result--excessive speculation. The Bank of Bombay now 
entered its second phase towards its downfall and incurred 
losses from which it would never recover. 
As was previously stated, the Back Bay Reclamation 
Company had given much stimulus to speculation by the public 
sale of 400 shares of stock originally intended for Government 
purchase. The public auction on July 6, 1864 lasted less than 
two hours. By the close of the following day the entire amount 
lSibid., I, p. 163. 
17Ibid., I, p. 164. 
16 rdem. 
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of purchase money, over a million pounds, was at the bankers--
18 
striking proof of the wealth of Bombay. In a letter dated 
July 23, 1864 Frere wrote to his predecessor, Sir George 
Clerk: 
All Bombay have gone mad, about Back Bay. I was 
anxio u s that Government should have had a share in the 
work, such as it has in the Bombay Bank, not so much to 
secure a share in the profits as to have the only possible 
effectual hold over the management in such matters as allot-
ment of shares. I do not think any one realized, as 
clearly as you did, the danger to the morale of the public 
service from these undertakings. One might as well try to 
stop a cyc lone as to check such speculations. . But 
if Government are large shareholders in every such work 
and have a potential interest in its management, the 
evil may be kept within some kind of bounds.19 
These were high hopes, but in the end it mattered little that 
the Government had a "share" in the Bank of Bombay while it 
had no connection with the Back Bay Reclamation Company, for 
it was now too late to stop the speculative mania which had 
overtaken Bombay. 
During the remainder of 1864 and the early part of 1865 
companies were started for every imaginable purpose--banks and 
financial associations, land reclamation, trading, cotton 
cleaning, pressing, and spinning companies, livery s tab les and 
veterinary companies, and companies for making bricks and 
18Times, August 5, 1864, p. 10, col. 2. 
19 . . t Martineau,~- ~-, II, p. 7. 
34 
·1 20 ti es. The Times noted: 
Every day a new company enters the market, and there 
is a rush for shares, with endless heart burnings and 
counter accusations. Hardly one of these companies has 
paid a dividend, yet the shares sell at premiums which 
the maddest speculator never dreampt of, and which can 
never make a return to the victim who will be caught in 
the reaction that is bepending. . at present men in 
Bombay do not think of such con temptible things as 
dividends. They buy shares cheap to sell them dear. 21 
And a contemporary, Wacha, wrote: 
In the Bombay of 1864-1865 every tenth man was either 
a promoter, embryo promoter or director. And as to the 
number of bankers and managers it was l egion, each and 
all absorbed in pocketing the largest premium on share 
allotments made by hundreds every day.22 
This was just the time when the Bank of Bombay should 
have been extremely cautious as to its advances. But un-
fortunately the mismanagement which was begun in 1863, 
continued, and the Presidency bank became a principal factor 
in fostering financial speculation in the city. 
The Bank secretary, Mr. Blair now determined to obtain 
the directors' sanction for the practice which he had been 
20wacha lists 25 banks, 39 financial associations, 7 
land and reclamation companies and approximately 30 misce l-
laneous companies as being established, ?r in the_case of 
banks, significantly enlarging their capital, during 1863-
1865. Wacha, A Financial Chapter, PP· 24-32. 
21T. ime s, January 24, 1865, p. 9, cols. 4-5. 
22wacha, Rise and Growth of Bombay Municipal Govern-
~ (Madras, 19~ p:-21. 
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carrying on for months, that of granting cash credits solely 
on the security of the borrower's signature . On June 2, 1864 
the board of directors voted in favor of such a resolution. 
Robert Hannay (later on the board of the Bank, December 1864-
April 1866), testifying before the Royal Commission, explained 
the circumstances behind this sanction. Hannay recalled that 
Blair had approached him sometime before June 1864 asking him 
to jot down what he considered to be the Scotch system of 
cash credit; Hannay obliged and told the Commission that he 
had heard no more from Blair about the matter. The Commission 
examiners showed Hannay a copy of the resolution of June 2, 
1864. 
ment. 
Hannay saw immediately that Blair had altered his state-
Hannay had correctly outlined the Scotch system of 
cash credits as requiring a bond signed by the primary party 
together with two good names as security. But the resolution 
which Blair presented to the board members read as follows: 
It is respectfully suggested that the number of credit 
accounts might be greatly increased if the system prac-
tised in Scotland was introduced, viz., on a bond for 
a certain amount being signed by the party requiring 
the accomodation with or without good names as security 
according to the credit of the party. At present no 
person, in however good credit, can have a credit account 
with the bank unless he can lodge Government paper as 
security , besides signing a bond which has to be renewed 
every three months. Whereas, if the above system was 
adopted, the account might run on from year to year. 23 
23 Royal Commission Report, Appendix, Exhibit A48, 
p. 32. 
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The underlined portion of the statement had been added 
in what the Commission determined to be Blair's handwriting. 
Hannay said that he was unaware of this alteration, even when 
he became a member of the board. Blair, on the other hand, 
knew that this statement was incorrect in two areas. First he 
knew that he had altered Hannay's definition of the Scotch 
system of credit. Secondly, in saying that no person, in 
however good credit, could get a cash credit from the bank 
unless he could l odge Government paper, Blair was conveniently 
forgetting that he had already been following this practice 
for some months. 
The resolution of June 2, 1864 is important in that now 
the directors gave their open approval to a reckless system of 
banking. The commercial directors during this period were 
Hannay, Steel, Mc Ilwraith, Scott, Lidderdale, A. Brown, 
Tracey, Cassels, Cowasjee Jehangees, Premchund Roychund, and 
Cowasjee Manockjee. The Government directors included Birch, 
Mangles, Ravenscroft, Jacomb, F. S. Chapman, and Livingston. 
These men share varying amounts of guilt, as some only served 
the bank for a short length of time. Whether they had known 
of Blai r's previous intrigues or not, they now sanctioned 
the carrying out of such a policy. As businessmen themselves, 
the directors should have used caution in such action and not 
re l ied so heavily upon the secretary. The directors along 
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With everyone else i'n b h h d Born ay w o a money or could borrow 
some, engaged in much speculation in the new companies 
Spri . 
nging up at this time and so had little time to give to 
th · 
eir bank duties. Mr. Hannay admitted under questioning that 
he depended entirely upon Blair for knowledge of what was 
going on and said, "the bank had got on well under his manage-
ment, but sometimes r wondered how it was that it had paid 
such good dividends. 1124 As a director and later president 
Of the bank, Hannay should have found out for himself. 
From the date of the resolution a most unchecked 
system of advances began. The directors who now were aware of 
the b 
ank policy and surely must have known of the large sums 
be · 
ing borrowed, made no effort to inquire as to the credit 
Of th . l ose borrowing money. Loan applications were no onger 
brought up before the board for their sanction. Hannay by 
means of excuse stated before the Commission, "I heard it 
Saia by the directors then that it was impossible to state 
What a man was worth, and that a reliable discount list 
cou1a 2s 
not be made out." 
The President of the Bank at this time was Sylvester 
D. B · d . th t . lrch, a Government director who had serve in a capacity -------- -- --- -24
Ibid . , evidence given in England , P· 247 · -2-
::i_Ibi' d., 240 p. . 
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previously in Bombay and Madras. Birch believed in lending 
money on personal security and so took no measures to stop 
Blair 's actions. Under testimony Birch admitted that Blair 
disobeyed bank policy by advancing money on shares, "yet he 
neither brought his conduct before the Board, nor took steps 
to put a stop to the practice, but contented himself with 
telling Mr. Blair that he had no right to make such advance s . 1126 
Birch did not attend any bank meetings during July, 
Augus t, and September 1864, explaining that he had been ill. 
Apparent ly this was not the case, for the Commission discovered 
that he was not too ill to a ttend to his other personal 
business during this period. The other Government directors 
at this time, Mangles, Ravenscroft, and Jacomb took littl e 
interest in the bank's affairs. They attended weekly meet-
ings and that was all . Testimony revealed that Ravenscroft 
thought that the secretary had powers secured to him by 
byelaws and beyond that acted in conjunction with the Presi-
dent and commercial directors, whereas Mangles and Jacomb 
27 thought the bank was managed by the President and secretary. 
In July 1864 Blair came under the influence of the 
powerful Hindu financier, Premchund Roychund who that month, 
26 Ibi'd., S 13 ummary, p. . 
27 Idem. 
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became a native director. Premchund Roychund was a very 
enterprising young man. The son of a merchant, Premchund 
became a sharebroker in Bombay at sixteen year s of age. 
Possessed with exceptional ability as a financier he quickly 
went to the top--by 1863 his reputation as the leading share-
broker as well as one of the most venturo u s of the cotton 
merchants and speculators was established, though he was only 
thirty-three. There is no parallel to his career between 
1863 and 1865 as the Caesar of Bombay finance. During this 
time of prosperity Premchund's advice and cooperation were 
most eagerly sought by both company promoters and speculative 
investors. He seems to have been himself a moderate man, a 
contemporary writes that "he e n deared himself by his simpli-
city, amiability, and many private virtues, to all of the 
people, irrespective of color, caste and creed. 1128 
He donated vast sums of money to charity and to various 
causes in Bombay, the most notab l e being a gift of 2 lakhs of 
rupees for the erection of a University Library in the city. 
But Premchund did not use his wealth and powerful influence 
for solely benevolent ends. The Royal Commission blamed much 
of the bank's reckless policy on Premchund: 
28 Wacha, Premchund Roychund (Bombay, 1913), p. 77. 
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. intelligent and subtle, Premchund Roychund was 
not slow to fathom the imbecility and weak moral character 
of Mr. Blair, and soon acquired great influence over him 
and his subordinates, with complete command of the funds 
of the bank .... Premchund Roychund also bought and 
sold shares for Mr. Blair, and entered into joint 
speculation with him, and never charged him a rupee for 
brokerage. 1129 
Premchund was aided in his bid for influence at the Bank 
of Bombay by the retirement of the former native director 
Sir Cowasji Jehanghir. Sir Cowasji had leant a certain amount 
of restraint to the Board of directors though he frequently 
had s tood alone in his opposition to proposals including 
that of increasing the bank's capital and of advancing money 
on bank shares. It has been stated that the "vigorous and 
increas ing vigilance of Sir Cowasji, while on the Board, was 
so great, and his moral influence so over-powering, that the 
management dare do no wrong or advance so incautiously as to 
incur a loss. 1130 Sir Cowasji's retirement was the signal for 
Premchund to do as he pleased--there now was no check or con-
tro l of the kind Sir Cowasji had exercised. 
As the European directors were constantly changing, 
and were immersed in their own firms or in speculation, they 
had little inclination or time to become very familiar with 
29 Royal Commission Report, Summary, p. 14. 
30wacha, Premchund Roychund, pp. 123-124. 
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their responsibilities to the Bank. In consequence they left 
the job of investigating applicants for loans to the secretary 
and the native director. Soon Premchund's position with the 
Bank became so potent that he had only to recommend to Blair 
that a loan or advance be given, and it was done. "The 
31 result was that the Bank became Premchund's," stated the 
Royal Commission report. A contemporary of the period adds, 
"to say that the directors e ntrusted the destinies of the 
Bank to the Secretary, that the Secretary left them at the 
mercy of Mr. P remchund and that Premchund left them to Provi-
32 dence is no exaggeration of the real state of the Bank." 
Premchund ran an extremely complex operation. As the 
myriad of new companies grew, he found himself in a position 
of such prominence that his name and influence were considered 
essential to the safe launching of any of the ephemeral schemes 
of the day. If not himself the promotor of a company, he 
would receive a l arge allotment of shares in it and the pro -
motors would then allow him to help distribute the much sought 
after shares. 
Premchund was a master of this type of operation for 
he knew the people who would make the best shareholders. He 
31 Royal Commission Report, Summary, p. 14. 
32 Wacha, A Financial Chapter, p. 91 . 
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was always careful to see that the managers and directors 
of banks, including naturally Blair and Robertson, the new 
deputy secretary of the Bank of Bombay, got an allotment of 
shares . He also distributed shares to the friends of the 
promotors and to persons who might prove useful in the new 
company's undertakings. If any of his friends needed money 
with which to buy wanted shares, Premchund had only to write 
a letter of recommendation to Blair and a loan was easily 
p rocured. If Premchund himself had shares to sell he might 
of fer them to a friend and at the same time aid the buyer 
obtain the needed purchase funds through a loan from the Bank 
of Bombay. Premchund at times helped his friends procure 
loans in their names though he was the ultimate user of the 
money for speculative purposes. Blair was Premchund's 
accomp lice in such "transactions," the bank directors knew 
noth ing of them. To remain on friendly terms with Blair, 
P remchund entered into joint transactions with him, with 
Premchung supplying all of the money to purchase the shares! 
The total amount of his dealings was tremendous. His 
personal debt to the bank was 42 lakhs f{ 420,000); the lo a ns 
obtained by him for others who then used the money to purchase 
shares from him amounted to 66,900,000 rupees (7 669,000), of 
wh ich 43, 45, 478 rupees () '434,547) was lost with the failure 
of the bank; the lo ans procured not in his name though 
43 
ultimately used by him amounted to 29,58,938 rupees (,1' 295,893) 
of which 13,02,408 rupees 33 (/ 130,240) were lost. 
Tes timony before the Royal Commission revealed how the 
loan transactions took place. Most cases were similar to that 
of Sorabj ee Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, who states: 
Premchund came to me one day in July 1864 at my 
bungalow on Malabar Hill, and asked me if I had any 
Bombay Reclamation Company's shares. I said, "No." He 
told me to apply for them to Mr. Cowasjee Jehangeer. 
I wrote a note to Cowasjee Jehangeer. He said in reply 
that all the shares he had were distributed amongst his 
f riends, and that there were no more remaining with him 
to give me. 
Next day Premchund called on me and asked whether I 
had received a f avorable reply from Cowasjee. I said, 
"No," and produced Cowasjee's note. He read it and 
said it was all bosh. He said, "Never mind, I will 
manage all that for you," and told me to give him a 
commission to purchase for me as many shares as I 
wished. I told him that I was short of money, and I 
could do no more than purchase a few shares. Premchund 
thereupon said, "Take my word, Sorabjee, and do not 
trouble yourself about money. I will get you as much 
as you require. But do not go in for less than one 
hundred shares." I expressed surprise at his proposal, 
seeing that I was unable to pay for all these shares . 
He told me that he could procure ten lakhs of rupees in 
a twinkling. I agreed to it, and asked how he could 
manage it. He said he would get the money from the 
Asiatic and the Bombay Banks. The next day or the day 
after that, he sent me two notes, one addressed to 
Mr. Morrison, the Manager of the Asiatic Bank, and one 
to Mr. Blair. In the latter he wrote--"My dear Mr. Blair 
could you accomodate Sorabjee with five lakhs?" The letter 
to Mr. Morrison was of the same purport. On the other side 
of the two chits he had got replies from Mr. Blair and 
33 Royal Commission Report, Summary , p. 15. 
Mr. Morrison, saying they would give the money with 
pleasure. 
Ne xt day he called on me at my office, and asked me 
if I was able now to go in for shares. I said "No, 
not the hundred," and gave him a commission for forty-
three shares only. Ten lakhs were not sufficient for 
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the purchase money of forty-three shares, so Premchund 
asked me to send in some money to the Banks to my credit. 
I accordingly did so . It was about Rs 60,000; Rs 26 , 500 
to the Bank of Bombay, and Rs 40,000 to the Asiatic. On 
the 14th of July he came to me personally for the cheques, 
and asked me to hand them over to him. I accordingly did 
so. I cannot remember whether I ever signed a promissory 
note. Cash credits had been opened in my name. I think 
that was all. I gave Premchund cheques for the whole 
amount out of both Banks . 
. A few days after he sent me allotment certifi-
cates of forty-three shares, standing in the names of 
Premchund himself , his father Roychund, Navalchund his 
b rother-in-law, Herrjee Jehangeer, brother of Cowasjee 
Jehangeer and Mr. Cassels. . I was rather at a loss 
to account for shares belonging to Premchund, his father, 
and brother-in-law, and other Directors of the Bombay 
Reclamation Company being for sale . . parties whose 
shares I should not have expected to be in the Bazaar.34 
A merchant, Kursondass Madhowdass gave the following 
account: 
Premchund came to me and said that he was asked by 
the Bank of Bombay to get money invested, and asked me 
whether I would take a loan of three or four lakhs. He 
said, "They do not know what to do with their money." I 
took four lakhs (,l-' 40,000) for three months. I gave a 
promissory note without security.35 
Fleming, a partner in the firm of Nicol and Company , 
obtained a cash credit for 10 lakhs (i100,ooo) in J anuary 1865, 
34 Ibid., evidence given in India, p. 44. 
35 rbid., p. 42. 
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on the security of a promissory note. 
tiations with Blair: 
He recounted his nego-
The Elphinstone Company, of which my firm were the 
secretaries and treasurers at that time, owed my firm 
12 lakhs of rupees, and they were not likely to be in a 
posi tion to repay the advance for rather more than a 
month. I required a part of the money, and I went 
over to the Bank of Bombay to see Mr. Blair, and to 
ascertain whether I could obtain an advance from the 
Bank of Bombay. I was prepared to make explanations 
as to why I needed the money, and, if need be, to 
offer security. Mr. Blair granted me the loan at once, 
immediately on my asking for it. He refused to hear any 
exp lanations at all, but turned to Mr. Robertson, who, 
if my memory serves me right, was in the same room, and 
said, "Let Mr. Fleming have 10 or 20 lakhs, or whatever 
he requires." I urged very much making some explanation, 
for it was an anomalous thing my borrowing such a sum 
of money at the time, but he would not listen to anything 
which I had to say.36 
If the secretary, Blair and his ally Premchund were 
unwise managers of the Bank of Bombay they were even less so 
when it came to managing the bank's six branch offices. 37 
These branches were under the superintendence of the secretary 
a l one. The weekly accounts of the business done at the 
branches were never shown to the board of Directors. Clearly, 
from testimony before the Royal Commission thes e branches 
were directly subordinate to Blair and to an inspector of 
36 rbi'd., S 16 ummary, p. . 
37 These branches were located at Poona, Ahmedabad, 
Surat, Dharwar, Kurrachee, and Kalbadevi. 
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b ranches. These inspectors had no set instructions to follow 
a nd in fact seldom if ever visited the branches. Visits were 
made only if there were cause, for as Blair observed, "it 
was so expensive to send inspectors through India, that I 
f ancy it was not necessary unless something was really wrong--
h . . 1138 be cause everyt ing was going on well. 
The managers of these branches had few defined duties. 
William Bullock, the manager of the Kalbadevi Branch, admitted 
that he only had verbal instructions, that he kept in constant 
touch with Blair and when he did try to extract instructions 
from him he "never could get anything more from him than a 
d irection to follow Premchund's advice. 1139 As there were no 
d i s count lists the agents were told that they should be the 
judge as to the credit of the applicant, or else refer to 
P remchund for his judgment. 
This policy of handing out loans to whomever wanted 
one for whatever purpose, was obviously a dangerous affair. 
No t only did it foster the already rampant speculative fever, 
b ut the bank began to suffer losses of capital in consequence 
o f the inadequate check made on the borrowers. 
38 Royal Commission Report, Summary, p. 17. 
39 b. d . d . . d. 8 I 1 . , evi ence given in In 1a, p. 4 . 
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In its Annual Report for 1863-1864 published in October 
18 6 4, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce issued only a mild warn-
ing concerning the speculation which was taking place: 
One of the principal features of the year in Bombay 
has been the great increase in banking and financial 
companies which we have lately witnessed. Another 
feature has been the excessive speculation in all sorts 
of Joint-Stock shares which has been pushed to an extent 
which the Committee cannot but regard as full of danger 
to the well-being of the community.40 
The report spoke mainly about the continued prosperity and 
increas ing wealth of Bombay. Unfortunately, the Chamber of 
Commerce delayed until the following year the circulation 
of a more definitive condemnation of the economic situation 
in Bombay, by the n it was too late. 
The Government of India and Frere did not ignore the 
situation , but their efforts at checking the speculative 
fever proved abortive. As the Chamber of Commerce Annual 
Repo rt stated, there was both a good and bad side to the com-
merc ial revolution underway in the Presidency. Miserable 
hovels and bungalows, filthy streets and disgraceful sanita-
tion facilities began to give way to new buildings, streets 
and even a university. But a darker side progressed just as 
rapidly. The rich became richer, utterly demoralized by the 
speculation, and the poor became poorer. Among those who 
40 Wacha, A Financial Chapter, p. 22. 
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s uffered the most were those men with a fixed income, notably 
British Government officials. Prices in Bombay for services, 
food and housing had quadrupled in less than four years, yet 
their salaries had not been increased proportionately. A 
repo rter for the ~ime~ wrote: 
It should be known in England that it is impossible 
for a married man to live in Bombay on a thousand a 
year ; that Englishmen are separating themselves from 
their wives and families for years, because they cannot 
afford to keep them in Bombay; that there are many 
subalterns and even captains of Her Majesty's army, 
who live like poor curates, in a country where so to 
live is death, who, in sober truth, cannot afford to 
have butcher's meat on their tables more frequently 
than once a week. 41 
Those who could l eft Government service or took extra jobs, 
whi le those who remained were tempted to dabble into the 
share-market. 
Sir Bartle Frere realized the gravity of the situation. 
In a letter to Sir George Clerk he states: 
But in the case of stipendiary people, especially 
Gove rnment servants ... they are really starving, and 
I never in my thirty-one years of service, saw and 
heard of so much real distress among that class. All 
are more or less affected. 42 
But Frere's entreaties failed to convince Wood to raise 
the civil servants' salaries, perhaps because to increase them 
41 Times, January 24, 1865, p. 9, col. 4. 
42 Martineau, II, p. 10. 
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throughout India. Costs in Bombay had risen at a significantly 
higher rate than in the rest of India, and though increases 
were needed elsewhere, the need was more critical in Bombay. 43 
In a letter of November 20, 1864 to Wood, he writes: 
The distress among all except the higher paid classes 
of Government servants in Bombay and Poona, is really 
beyond belief, and I am assured that officers on the pay 
of captains, and the lowest paid grade of the Civil 
service can barely live as single men, and that married 
men have to submit to privations of food, house-room, and 
conveyance for themselves and their families. To our 
last appeal on this subject, the Government of India has 
finally answered in a few lines that it makes no change 
in their previous opinions.44 
While thousands of government officials left the service, 
Frere attempted to counsel those who remained as to the evils 
of speculation. He resurrected a minute formerly published 
by Clerk, as well as by Dalhousie and Elgin regarding the 
interference by civil servants with the management of Joint-
Stock Companies. It states: 
43 An artic l e in the Economist of February 4, 1865 sug-
gested that the state of things in the Bombay Presidency re-
quired watchfulness and perhaps reorganization. It noted 
that " a formal proposal by the Governor of a Presidency, 
himself a civilian, for an increase of salaries to the extent 
of one-half a million a year at one blow, is, to say the l east 
of it, an unusual phenomenon. Even to make such a proposal 
is to spread discontent at its rejection over a whole Presi-
dency , and to grant it would have involved fresh taxation. 
The true solution, if the need is not temporary,--which we 
doubt--is to employ fewer men on better salaries; but Sir 
Bart le Frere and Bombay generally require looking after." 
Economis t, Vol. XXIII, Feb. 4, 1865, p. 128. 
44 . II Martineau, , pp. 11-12. 
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The Gover · ·1 all . nor in Counci now desires to point out to 
public serv t f G · · per· d ans o overnment, at this particular 
in Bio 'when there is so strong a tendency to speculation 
ombay th t • . spi· . , e ex reme importance of obedience to the 
lett a t e previous orders, rather the n to the mere rit of 11 h . 
re 
_er of the law. He believes it to be sufficient to 
mind ll . avo'd' a public servants of the great importance of 
tak~ning any connection, however remote, with any under-
theirg wh~ch might tend under any contingency to fetter 
im actions, or divert them from the numerous and 
upportant r
4
esponsibilities imposed by the public service 
on them. 5 
But though Frere as Governor could suggest what the 
Proper conduct of a civil servant should be, he had no power 
a government employee from engaging in speculation. to prohibit 
J:n a letter 
of February 14, 1865 to Sir George Clerk he shows 
his f rustrat· ion: 
n A few words from sir Charles Wood as to the absolute 
ecessity of keeping clear of share-jobbing would have a 
~reat effect. But it is cruel; while enforcing this, to 
i~ thhold any improvement in the pay of our servants. It 
0 
rather hard to a High court Judge, an Advocate-General, 
1
r Secretary to Government to have more work than his fel-
sow in Calcutta and less pay, but still they can live and 
r!:e a little. r can without compunction tell them to 
si ist dipping into the golden stream which flows on every 
st~e_but it is hard work for the smaller fry to keep 
aight with a wife and children skimped at home- You 
would be shocked at the stories I sometimes hear of men, 
and women too dancing attendance on "promoters," native 
and E ' "d t t th . uropean, and justifying it to themselves as u Y a 
eir f . 1 · , 6 ami ies. ·, 
The speculation in Bombay may never have assumed such 
Inass · ive proportions but for the introduction of the use of 
45 
Ibid., p. 13. 
46Ibid-, PP· 13-14. --
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"t. ime-bargains II 1· nto h d t e share an cotton markets. As the 
0 
cotton varied from month to month, as much as from Price f 
n· inepence to two shillings, this price fluctuation began to 
be the subject for "bets" as to its worth on a particular, 
Shares of stock were "bet" on in a like manner. future d t a e. 
A "t· ime-bargain 11 is essentially a contract in which one party 
sell to another party a certain number of shares in agrees to 
ace rtain 
the . Price 
company with delivery at a future agreed date at 
s pecified at the time of the contract. 
These " time-. 
barg • a1ns 11 were legally invalid in England, but India had no 
Prohibit. ive laws. Frere offered his support for a bill to 
it these "time-bargains." such a bill passed the Prohib' 
Bomb ay Legislative council and was sent to Calcutta for 
Gove rnmental sanction in November, 1864. 
T' ime was running out. 
bar . gains" we re to run for three to six roan thS ' in reality it 
See ms that the settlement day for the vast majority had been 
Set f b or July 1, 1865
_ A governmental decision was imperative 
efore the Indian courts became jammed with cases arising from 
Probl ems that certainly would arise when the buyers found they 
<::ould not pay for the shares- As the government delayed its 
decis· 
ion f 1 d Party B who 
re h 
11 
• • " sales deve ope · 
s time-bargain 
had 
bought p t c to procure funds 
from Party A, now sold to ar Y 
t o Pay 
f f p rty D Each paper 
or a II time-bargain" secured rom a . 
Though in theory these "time-
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transaction brought fantastic profits to the seller, and as 
word spread in the Share Bazaar, more and more people rushed 
to en rich themselves. It greatly annoyed Frere that the 
Gove rnment of India ignored his repeated requests for action. 
He writes to Sir John Lawrence on June 22, 1865: 
The Bill did not propose to interfere with time-bargains 
in any way beyond applying the existing English law to 
them, and leaving them out of court to be dealt with as 
mere gambling debts, or debts of honour. I therefore 
approved the Act, which was passed by a majority of the 
Council, and sent it to you in November, and have 
since heard nothing more about it. 
Cotton has risen in price fifty per cent in two months, 
but the cotton-market is stagnant, not for want of cotton, 
or of buyers, or sellers, or of money, but because every 
man is holding every rupee he can command to be ready for 
a great settlement of time-bargains in July, when, I am 
assured on good authority, some thirty or forty millions 
sterling will change hands, according to the then price of 
cotton, opium, Government-paper, but above all, of shares 
of joint-stock companies, many of which exist only on 
paper. 
Of course there must be a tremendous crash, and the 
best and most cautious will find great difficulty in 
getting paid what is owing to them in legitimate trade. 
The Court will be overwhelmed with business, and be sore l y 
puzzled to apply the law, for it is in a very doubtful 
state, and all that is certain is that the later English 
Acts do not apply here. 47 
Again ,he writes, on July 7, 1865: 
I hope you will now assent to our Act for throwing 
these time-bargains out of Court. There can be no doubt 
they have been one great cause of all the misery and ruin 
we see around us here now. There would, of course, h ave 
47 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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been over-trading and mad speculation of all kinds unde r 
comm . 
5 
ances when so much money was thrown into a any circum t 
unity p 1 -But the _ecu iarly prone to ~peculation and gambling. 
The h evil_has been intensified by these time-bargains. 
kinyd ave this peculiarity as compared with all other 
s of bett. h h guis ing, tat t ey are carried on under the 
any e of trade, and the settling day is so far off that 
may unusual change in the price of the article bet on 
of t~:use such prolonged uncertainty as to the solvency 
peo 
1 
betters, as seriously to embarrass all non-betting 




easy to say "do not bank with a banker who thinks 
ore of th 
hous ,, e Derby or rouge-et-noir table than his coUnting -
hou e. But if the betting be carried on in the counting-
cau~e and under the forms of ordinary trade, the most 
ious man in Lombard street may be taken in. 
You 
is must not suppose that because the first of July 
barpa
5t 
there is an end of the evil consequences of time-
ea ~ains which then fell due. The only step gained was 
ofc man's knowledge of his own losses; a few slipped out 
si 
th
eir liabilities by informalities in the tender, or 
smmtlar modes of getting off their bets; some of the 
twa ler fry compromised on the spot, promising to pay 
thenty-five or thirty per cent of their losses, but to 
weelgreat majority in number as well in character and 
ama 
th
' the effect was merely to fix the liability and 
b ount, and to allow the lawyers to commence a settlement 
oi pettifogging duello instead of the summary settlements 
Tattersall's and the Jockey club committee.
48 
p · inally in July 1865 it turned out that the time-
gains b · · 1 t h d ba:r .  ill sent some eight months earlier to Ca cut a a 
een 1 05t 
by a government official while in transit between 
Sirn1a 
John Lawrence had never even read it, so 
a nd Calcutta. 
cou1a s carcely have acted to right the situation. 
------48 
Ib'd ~·, p. 16. 
for 
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The role played by the Bank of Bombay in lending money 
was not generally known, at least 
these "t· ime-bargains " 
not by the right people. 
Frere under testimony to the Royal 
sates he had no evidence of any wrong doing until Comm· 1.ssion t 
March 1865. On March 3, 1865 Sir Charles Wood wrote to him: 
a c~ can~ot help being in some alarm at the possibility o f 
rumoash in your Bombay speculations. We hear disagreeable 
on 
1
rs, and after the way in which they have b8en going 
bank am afraid that it is pr o b able. Pray look after your 
would and currency matters. We must stand clear; but I and d send for your Government directors in the bank, 
bank esire them to look very carefully into what the 
1.s doing, and to keep you informed.49 
Exactly how Wood had fo und out about the bank's indis-
cret· ions is not clear; Frere states 
that wood acted after 
and Masterman's Bank that 
rece. . l.V1.ng information from the Agra 50 
was making advances upon shares. the Bank of Bombay 
Frere acted immediately to look closely into the Bank's 
rnan agement. 865) He charged a newly appointed (March 8, 1 
rnment director, Francis Chapman, to pay particular atten-Gove 
tion to the bank's proceedings. prere recounts his first hint 
Of wrongd . oing came when Chapman reported that; 
On his . look at some of the books, when he 
first asking to t. (I went to the bank, the secretary for the _,me 
a sam not certain which of them it was) said, in rather 
di arcastic manner, "We are glad to se~ a Government " 
rector taking an interest in the business of the bank. 
P ·ct nee given in England, 
· _...._.~ Commission ~epo~, evi e 
so 
Ib"d ~-, p. 208. 
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Mr· Cha . . inti· ~man mentioned this casually . That was the first 
ma tion h · h d . most w ic I ever ha that anything less than a 
proce~omplete devotion to their duty characterized the 
dings of the Government directors.51 
Chapman's own testimony is most revealing. He parti-
cularl Y remembers his first board meeting--"I made my bow to 
my brother directors ' 
to be done, and we walked out.
1152 
and we were told that there was no 
At subsequent board 
business 
meet· ings, 
no business of any sort was brought up, no r were any 
bank's books presented for the directors' scrutiny. of the 
A
nd 
so the Government of India and that of the Bombay 
Presidency began to look into the affairs of the Bank of 
But this was no easy task. 
tou h c wi th the Government directors 
Bomb ay. 
Frere kept in constant 
but the full truth was 
not d' iscerned for some months-
1865, Robert Hannay a member of the firm 
On March 2 ' 
Of G rey and company, who had been a commercial director since 
the Previous December, and who was a member of the consultat-
ing Committee of the Asiatic Bank, was elected President of 
the B ank f 0 Bombay. 
igned in February and whose leaving the directors duly 




by un · 
1 
olving "that the most.. cordial thanks 
animous y res 
directors be conveyed to Mr- Birch, for his ~ong con-
t· inued " and most valuable services to the Bank of Bombay. And 
51 
Ibid ~·, p. 227. 
52Ibid-, P· 145. --
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as if this w ere not enough they further resolved: 
to ~hat Mr. Birch be requested on his return to England 
gooaa:e ~ full length portrait of himself painted by a 
same b rtist, at_ the expense of the bank, and that the 
as a e placed in the board room of the new building, 
bank r~co7d of Mr. Birch's valuable services to the 
' uring the five years of his chairmanship.SJ 
On becoming President, Hannay made no immediate alter-
ation 
. into the practices of the Bank, but began to make some 
1nquir· ies d an soon he discovered that money was being lent 
on 
Promissory notes, with as well as without, shares being 
dep0 . sited 





of such a practice felt that such a policy was 
View of the tight money situation in Bombay because 
of the approaching end of the American Civil War 
1865 
it a depression in the cotton market. On April 12, 
Hannay introduced a resolution to sanction the trans-
actions wh· . h 
ich had already taken place and to relieve t e money 
~arket by 
permitting additional ones. 
as f 
Ollows-
With · Of reference to the following 
on ~hAugust ~nd 17 Septemb55 1863, e security of shares: 
SJ 
~-, Summary, p. 18. 
The resolution read 
Board Resolutions 
as regards advances 
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without These resolutions prohibited advances on shares 
their being brought before the full board. Blank 
Resolved, that the Secretary be authorized at his 
discretion, to advance on the shares of the under-
noted companies to the extent of the amounts marked 
opposite each. 
Shares so deposited are not to be transferred to the 
Bank, but the certificates to be accompanied by blank 
transfers signed by the transferor. 
Bank of Bengal, 
paid up 8,000 rupees (/ 800) 
present market rate 16,000 rupees G/ 1,600) 
premium old and new shares 
advance 6,500 rupe es G/ 650) on each share 
Bank of Madras, 
paid up 1,000 rupees (] 100) 
premium 123 % 
advance 75 % 
Agra Bank , 
paid up 500 rupees (i 50) 
premium 160 % 
advance 100 % 
Asiatic Bank, 
paid up 200 rupees (/ 20) 
premium 105% 
advance 75 % 
Oriental Banking Corporation, 
paid up 250 rupees (/ 25) 
premium 170 % 
advance 125 % 
Commercial Banking Corporation 
paid up 250 rupees ( 1- 25) 
premium 75 % 
advance 50% 
57 
space was l eft for their subsequent insertion. This never 
took place . Few, if any, of the directors were familiar 
with them and thus did not realize what they were rescinding. 
Bombay Reclamation Company, 
paid up 5,000 rupees (/ 500) 
premium 30,000 rupees (/ 3,000) 
advance 20,000 rupees (/ 3,000) 
Elphinstone Land 
paid up 1,000 
premium 1,450 
advance 1,000 
55 and Press Company, 
rupees (/ 100) 
rupees (/ 145) 
rupees premium (~ 100) 
In granting such advances the Secretary will in all 
cases intimate and insert in the bond, t hat should 
the shares deposited be depreciated in value during 
the currency of the loans, the security must be in-
creased or a partial payment made to reduce the debt; 
one percent above regular rate to be charged on such 
advances; and it is to be distinctly understood that 
such advances are only to be granted to first-class 
applicants.56 
58 
Under testimony before the Commission Hannay stated 
that it was the secretary who decided who was a first-
class applicant. And when asked why the particular com-
panies were selected, Hannay said he believed implicitly in 
land companies. No doubt another consideration involved 
was tha t Hannay was then a director of the Bombay Reclamation 
Company, and other bank directors, Premchund Roychund and 
55 Founded in 1859 for the purpose of reclaiming land 
on the eastern foreshore from the sea, constructing wharves 
and piers, erecting warehouses, buildings for pressing 
cotton, and other facilities for the Port of Bombay. The 
company had established a strong foundation before the 
speculative mania began, but nevertheless its shares being 
in the market, men began to gamble with them and the price 
of the shares was highly inflated. 
56 Royal Commission Report, Appendix, Exhibit Al83, 
p. 62. 
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Tracey, had interests in this company as well as the Asiatic 
Bank. Another director, Brown, was the secretary of the 
Elph· instone Land and Press company. 
irectors apparently voted on the rates at which 
The d' 
the shares 
of the companies were to be taken. When Lushing-
ton ob. Jected to the rate for the Bombay Reclamation company, 
oo high, Hannay had countered; "I believe that as b . eing t 
no gentleman in this room who would not be glad to there . lS 
number of those shares at 25,000 rupees if.250) buy any 
inst ead of 20,000 (/ 200) • II 5 7 
The commission Report commented 
th at such 
an observation was one which "Messrs, Tracey and 
, with their recent experience of buying shares at Pre mchund . 
a of 33,500 rupees (/ 3,350) and 34,000 rupees (/3,400) Premi 
Would no doubt confirm.
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co11 eagues knew best withdrew his objection and the resolu-
tion , 
And so Lushington thinking his 
Was passed. 
The powers of the secretary were now confirmed a
nd 
allowed to lend any amount on shares upon deciding Bla· ir was 
that the applicant was a first-class one-
In the period 
186
5, twenty-two advances 
from . its enactment 
on , 
shar es were made. 
to June 10, 














the bank amounting to 13,47,152 rupees (/134,715) 
Hannay testified that shortly after this resolution 
had b 
een Passed that he found loans on shares made at 
Blair's .• 
discretion which he felt to be poor risks; in fact 
had been advanced on shares of companies other than 
10ans 
those 
authorized. And so Hannay instructed Blair to make no 
future 
advances without the sanction of the directors or the 
weekly 
committee. Blair seemingly saw the light, and left 
for E 
ngland on April 29, 1865. Donald Robertson who had 
been" 
trained" by Blair and was a party to some of the worst 
dea1 · 
ings in Blair's period as secretary, succeeded him. Wi th 
the 
term· b 
ination of Blair's career at the Bank of Born ay, 
th






THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
(1865-1866) 
There bes· were additional causes for alarm in Bombay 
ides th Ina e affairs of the Bank of Bombay. Early in 1865 an 
fi telegraph service had been inaugurated. The a-European 
spent some eleven days in transit and not only 
quite garbled, but as they had been sent in French, 
rst messages 
Were th ey 
ifficulty of translating them into English upon ther e Was a d' · 
:teach· 1.ng Ind' 
s01 ia. 
th e transmittal time had been reduced to about 
By March much of the difficulty had been 
Ved and th 
:tee d ays 
Thus Bombay/Liverpool commercial and mercantile 
inf . 
ormat· ion could 
oor now be put on a more current basis- A 
the Times expressed skepticism over this: 
res pondent for 
Marvel 
People . ous fact! exclaims everyone; but the truth is, 
them tin India are not so grateful as you would expect 
9raph ~ be. Interference in details, such as the tele-
may yetempts both statesmen and merchants to indulge in, 
Guards tdo much evil here. We don't want the Horse 
fluct 
O 
direct our campaigns, or the Bombay market to 
chang~ate, when the Atlantic cable is laid, with every 
first m~n that of New york and New Orleans- one of the 
Liver rcantile messages received announced a panic in 
that :~ol ~nd Manchester as the result of intelligence 
tions w: Lincoln had consented to open peace negotia-
Arner · ith the south peace when it does come to 
b 
1.ca · . ld h . 
reath will cause a crash in India that men he t eir 
beca ' and the truth of the telegram is not yet known, 
t
. use · · f ion it has not been confirmed by subseiuent in orma-
, 
th
ough it has not been contradicted-
1 Times 5 _, April 6, 1865, P· 12, col- · 
61 
62 
erican Civil war which had so completely changed 
The Am . 
foundations of life in Bombay at its inception the economic 
in 1861 
' had 
an even more profound effect on Bombay, at its 
Close . in the spring of 1865. 
Abraham Lincoln had been 
inau gurated for his second term on March 4, 1865. 
He then 
summed Up h. . is immediate tasks: 
fir=~=h m~lice toward none; with charity for all; with 
right•ss in the right, as God gives us to see the 
bind ' let us strive to finish the work we are in; to 
have ~p the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall 
orpha ~rne the battle, and for his widow, and his 
Peacen -to do all which may achieve a just and lasting 
' among ourselves, and with all nations.
2 
Be ach· ieved his goal of peace early in April 1865 with the 
surrena er f f O Robert E. Lee. 
o:r the be full impact of the cessation of the American War to 
felt in Bombay. 
It took approximately two months 
Mean h' 
~ wile Frere along with the newly appointed Govern-
"'ent direct 
de ors, F. s. Chapman and J. Lushington (later Presi-
nt Of beg th
e Bank, from August, 1866 until its liquidation) 
an t 8 ° take a close look into the management of the Bank of 
ornbay. Alexander Brown, a newly elected commercial director 
join ea f orces wi'th d L h' ton Chapman an using • 
-----2 Vo1. Malon f ~i~'hbPerrttY (NeW york, 1960)' l e and Rauch, Emoire or 
' p. 793. ~ -
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Under testimony, Brown stated that soon after becoming 
a director he heard, 
t hat the Bank was involved in loans to men who 
had speculated l arge l y, a nd who had large time-bargains 
in shares for settlement on the first of July fo llowing . 
. On taking my seat at the board on the 27 April 1865, 
I asked Mr. Tracey (a commercial director ) whether in his 
opinion there was any ground for the rumours afloat. 
Business was just about to commence, and I had only time 
to get his answer that we had better not discuss the 
subject, as the Government directors were only too apt 
to take alarm. 3 
Brown continued by saying that Tracey's answer made him quite 
uneasy and he nearly determined to retire from his director-
ship, but instead he resolved to stay and endeavour to bring 
about a change for the better. 
Chapman took a step towards solving one of the bank's 
most blatant errors when, before the board meeting of May 4, 
1865 he questioned Br own as to whether he was satisfied with 
the way in which business was being conducted. 
the meeting: 
Brown recounted 
He particularly referred to the utter ignorance in 
which the directors were kept as to the business and 
every thing that was going on, and we agreed in opinion 
that the directors were ciphers, and the secretary apparently 
uncontrol led. Mr. F. S. Chapman then told me that both he 
and Mr. Lushington, the two Government directors, had 
come prepared to move in the matter, and I willing agreed 
to support him. 4 · 
p. 49. 
3 Royal Commission Report, evidence given in India, 
4 Idem. 
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At the board meeting that day Lushington proposed that 
res trictions should be imposed upon the secretary's powers 
to mak e advances. Lushington's proposal was strongly opposed 
by Hannay, then the Presiden t of t he Bank, who said that "men 
of s tanding had too much self-respect to submit to have their 
app li c ations scrutinized by the who l e board, and that, if we 
insis t e d, the bank would lose much valuab l e business. 115 
Lu s h i n g ton t e stified to the Commission that he had felt that 
the sooner those who might be dissa t isfied with such a check 
lef t t h e bank the better--"if they were ashamed of their 
loan s , or were ashamed that their loans should appear. 116 
Lush ing ton's proposal before the board resulted in a resolu-
tion which stated: "Resolved, that no new constituent of 
the bank be allowed credit beyond rupees three lakhs {/ 30,000) 
withou t the special sanction of three directors. 117 
Ob viously this resolution did not do what Lushington 
had expecte d. The effect of the resolution was to allow the 
sec r e tary , who was not even mentioned in it, to continue to 
make a dv ances up to three lakhs, and only restricting him in 
lending over that amount when ~ew constituents applied. At 
5 rbid., p. 50. 
6 rbid., evidence given in England, p. 185. 
7rde m. 
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the t· ime ' as Lush ' 
t  ington stated in his testimony, he had felt 
at th· is resolution would be a 11.·mi't 
on the powers of the 
secret ary. 
But though the written resolution as recorded in 
of the meeting does not state it, Lushington said the . minutes 
ana been a general discussion among the directors th t there had 
an understand' 
for ing was reached that~ future applicat ions 
loan . s should b 
tion e brought up before the board. The resolu-
certainly 
but fell short of stating this- such action is 
c example of the inexperience of the directors in 
another 
arry · ing out 
re sound business procedures and keeping accurate 
cord s; 
impression is not as good as a written statement. 
an · 
Thu 
in s, although the new directors felt that they had 
aug urated 
~•nt . a better state of things, there was little improve-
In fact loans continued 
in th to e practice as to advances. 
be on promissory notes on a single name without granted 
any addit• ional e~ security. 
Per· ience 
bank· of several more months to see the danger of such 
l.ng. 
The directors would need the 
Early · h 1 t •~ in May, 1865, a native merchant, t e arges 
Port er 
•no of cotton, Byramjee sormusjee cama, failed for an 
rinous 
Bomb 
amount of money [) 3,300,00D), owing the Bank of 
17,71,682 rupees (/ 177,168). when he c onvened his ay 
<:::red. 
l.tors 
e on May 17, they resolved to transfer his entire 
state some appointed trustees-to 
66 
The news o f this first and quite extensive failure 
sp r ead quickly throughout Bombay and led to a panic which 
l a s t e d the remainder of the month and the first part of June. 
The r e was a run on the Bank of Bombay, and the directors 
fea ring a suspension of payment applied to Frere who in turn 
te l e graphed Lawrence on June 15. Frere requested permission 
~ 
fo r the Government of Bombay to advance, if needed, 150 lkhs 
~ 
~l l,500,000) from the currency reserve, stating the importance 
of q uick action lest it "be too late to avert disaster 
f inancial, and political, more extensive than the failure of 
8 the banks.'' Lawrence agreed that this might be done, and 
as s oon as it was generally known in Bombay that the bank 
wo uld be supported, the run ceased, and no monetary assistance 
was needed. 
The Economist of June 10, 1865 devoted extensive space 
to a commentary on this crisis at Bombay. It felt that the 
c ri s is had been an entirely predictable event : 
The collapse of a mania is a certain result of the 
nature of a mania. It does not need an external force 
to destroy it, though an external force often helps, but 
it dies of itself and by the sudden substitution of the 
r e al difference of making money for the supposed facility 
of making it. 
8Ibid., Summary, p. 28. 
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At Bombay no kind of "shares"--nothing of this new 
imaginary unrealized wealth, is not saleable. For the 
moment there is no longer a just dist i nction between 
good undertakings and bad, all are i n much danger of 
suffering alike. "Woe to the last holder" is the motto 
of a panic. 
It is impossible to predict the exact end of such a 
mania, to fortell what precise quantity of ruin it would 
cause, to specify nicely where safety will begin. 
Two considerations ... may be suggested. . First, 
a great deal of money was made in Bombay. Much actual 
profit had accumulated there. . Bombay may lose 
much of its new cash, and yet still be richer than 
Bombay used to be. Secondly, it is probable that though 
the Indian cotton trade cannot be the unnaturally profit-
able trade it has been of late, it will still be a 
profitable trade. The Southern States of America must 
for a considerable period be disorganized; no one knows 
what their precise condition twelve months hence will be . 
. it is not possible that American production can for 
a long time reach its old quantity, and till it does so 9 
the India supplement must be needed and must be valuable. 
Frere described the situation in Bombay in a letter of 
J une 23, 1865 to Colonel Herbert Bruce: 
We have just now fallen on a commercial crisis of which 
no one not on the spot can form an idea. I have seen 
s u ch things in London, but all is here multiplied in 
the ratio of the greater credulity , timidity, and want 
of frankness which characterize the natives as compared 
with the Europeans, and the extent of failure is incredible. 
I see in the papers that there were three fai l ures in a 
fortn i ght for over a million, and I hear of one impending 
for six million sterling. 
It is of course a very anxious time for me, and the 
work, with only one colleague to help me, is very hard; 
but I have great confidence in him, and we have no 
minuting; and whatsoever may happen, I have no fears .for 
9Economist, June 10, 1865, Vol. XXIII, pp. 685-686. 
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the honour of Government. In this resoect I feel 
grateful to Sir Charles Wood for his s~pport in ridding 
me o f sharejobbers, and do not regret the black looks 
I have received from some of the cliques in Bombay. 10 
Though the Bank of Bombay had somehow weathered the 
storm while other companies were forced to liquidate, both 
Lawrence and Wood communicated their interest in the situa-
tion to Frere . Lawrence telegraphed the Bombay Government on 
June 2 1, 1865 to ask if steps had been taken to ascertain 
the q u ali t y of the outstanding bills and securities which 
the bank held. Frere r ep lied that this had been done and 
that "the advances on shares without collateral security 
were not large , nor the prices at which they were then valued 
h . h 11 11 ig . The Commission Report later chastised Frere for 
not checking more thoroughly into the "collateral security" 
which in many cases repre sented promissory notes on shares 
d h
' 12 an not ing more . 
Lawre nce's letter of June 22, 1865 t o the Government 
of Bombay , requested a full report as soon as possible r e -
garding the bank's affairs and outlined seven specific areas 
of interest. The chief points on which information was 
desired were; first, as to the assets and liabilities; 
-------- ---- - -
1 0Me rtin eau, II, p. 23. 
11 Royal Commission Report, Summary, p. 28. 
12 Ide m. 
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se condly , what had been the losses of the bank since the 
c omme ncement of the crisis; thirdly, what was the amount of 
ove rdue bills; fourthly, what proportion of that amount might 
be f airly expected to be realized; fifthly, what were the 
p rospe cts of the bank with reference to the bills which had 
ye t to run; sixthly, whether the provisions of the bank 
charte r as defined in Act X of 1863 had been violated; and 
13 
seventhly, what had been the rates of advances on shares. 
Frere received a private note from Wood at about this 
same time in which Wood asked: 
Pray desire your Government directors to look after 
the bank's proceedings. Their advancing on shares, 
such as you have at Bombay, is contrary to all banking 
p rinciples. It would be contrary to the charters of 
the banks of Calcutta a nd Madras. Unfortunately not so 
as to Bombay; but it is not the less wrong. 14 
In addition there had been a dispatch from the Se c re-
ta r y of State of India on June 2, 1865 in which referring 
to adva nces made by the Bank on shares of joint stock com-
pan i es , directed the Bombay Government to restrict the Bank's 
bus ine ss to the same business as had been authorized to be 
tran sacte d by the Bengal and Madras banks. It specifically 
ca lled upon the Government directors to take me asures to 
13 Ibid., evidence given in England, p. 209. 
14 Ibid., Summary, p. 29. 
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15 
c h e ck such advances. The Government of Bombay referred 
t hi s dispatch to the Government directors, and shortly there-
a ft e r, on June 29, 1865 another letter was sent to these 
d i rec tors requesting a confidential report on the state of 
the b a nk at that time. 
Certainly it cannot be denied that the Bank of Bombay 
as we ll as the Government of Bombay were now faced with a 
r es ponsibility to answer these requests . Their reply was 
mos t regrettable--the seven point inquiry made by Lawrence 
was ignored, and the directors contented themselves by only 
rep l y ing to the June 2, 1865 letter from the Secretary of 
State. 
The report of the Government directors dated June 30 , 
1 865 , concerned only advances made by the bank on shares. 
I t r e ferred to the resolution of April 12 , 1865 failing to 
explain that the August 6 and September 17, 1863 resolutions 
prohibiting advances on shares without their being brought 
befo re the full board were now rescinded. The letter further 
state d what shares had been taken as collateral security sub-
sequent to the Act of April 12, 1865, failing to mention that 
these shares were simply collateral secu rities to promissory 
no t e s of the borrowers. 
15 Idem. 
The letter misled the Go vernment of· 
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Bombay into believing that all was well. The Bombay Govern-
ment accepted this report, and forwarded it to the Secretary 
of State on July 8, 1865. 
Frere's letter of this date which accompanied the 
direc tors' reply stated that there could be little doubt that 
t h e val ue of the securities referred to in the directors ' 
report would improve, that the rumors about advances on Back 
Bay shares had been exaggerated, and that the Bombay Govern-
men t would reserve judging the elected bank directors until 
a p romised report from the Government directors had been 
d . d 16 stu ie . This was the only reply offered to the Governor 
General's letter of June 22, 1865. Under testimony, Frere 
fai led to produce a plausible explanation for this, stating 
on ly that the crisis had been more prolonged than expected, 
and it had been difficult to compute the value of any one 
security from day to day and hence make any judgment on it. 
Bombay, indeed , was in turmoil. The depression reached 
its very depth on July 1, 1865--the day on which hundreds of 
the time-bargains had become due. 
The ~conomist reported: 
It was the black d ay of Bombay. 
The whole commercial condition of Bombay is locally 
so peculiar and complicated, that we may expect to 
h ear of very singular occurrences. We are told, for 
16 rbid., p. 30. 
example, that lately large quantities of diamonds and 
pearls and precious gems bought a few months ago by 
the wealthy traders of Bombay chiefly for show, have 
been urgently offered for sale in the bazaar, in order 
to obtain silver for the payment of engagements.17 
And the Calcutta correspondent to the Times noted: 
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The lowest sum at which we can fairly take the extra 
profits made by Bombay in cotton during the four years 
of the American War is 50 millions. From the 50 
millions which were available for other p urposes than 
legitimate trading, we must deduct 10 as the amount of 
extra profit kept by the peasantry and middle men in 
the interior. This will leave 40 millions for specula-
tion in the island of Bombay. What has become of it? 
At least 5 have been sunk for the moment unproductively, 
in various land reclamation companies . . and I believe 
that 5 more have been taken to England by Scotch merchants. 
This leaves 30 millions, of which at least 10 have been 
lost in re-drafts for cotton. We are thus reduced 
to 20 millions, the debris, as it were, of the ruin now 
taking place. The local estimates of the liabilities 
of Bombay speculators for shares alone vary from 16 
millions to 30 millions. That is, one part of the com-
munity has paid, or promised to pay to the other for 
shares in barren companies at least 16 millions more than 
these shares are worth at par. These 20 millions are 
still in Bombay and will be available for legitimate 
trade and the completion of the best of the reclamation 
works when the crisis is over. At present, they have 
simp l y changed h ands,--changed,too, from a large number 
of small capitalists to half a dozen large millionaires. 
Six men may come out of the crash now going on with very 
heavy purses; all the rest of the island is insolvent.18 
In view of this tense financial situation in Bombay, 
the board of the bank meeting in July decided not to declare 
a dividend for the past half year ending June 30, 1865. Thi s 
17 . l l Economist, Ju y , 1865, Vol. XXIII, p. 781. 
18 . t 7 Times, Augus , 1865, p. 7, col. 3. 
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turned out to be a wise decision, for though the bank had been 
most profitab l e for the better part of the time period, the 
ex tent of its losses in the late panic was still not known. 19 
By late summer the situation had been alleviated some-
what ; prospec ts for cotton were improved with a slight price 
increase . Hope revived of a return to the past and once again 
the share bazaar became active. 
unheeded warning: 
The Times of India voiced an 
The maxim that a b urnt child dreads the fire does 
not hold good in the case of those with whom specula-
tion h as become a vice in their blood. Rather are they 
like the foolish moth which nothing but total destruc-
tion will cause to cease from folly. 2 0 
As the price of shares gradually rose at least one 
direc tor, Cowasjee Manackjee (a Commercial Director), advised 
se lling all shares which the bank had deposited as security 
fo r overdue bills. This would either pay off the debt or 
at least insure that the loss would not be total. But most 
19The secretary Robertson wrote in the report to the 
sha r eholders on August 7, 1865: "Taking rather an unfavor-
able view of the liabilities current on the 30th of June last, 
the d irectors estimate tha t the losses will not exceed thirty 
lakhs ; it is quite possible that the ultimate loss will be 
much less, so that there is every hope of the shareholders 
rece iving a fair dividend at the end of the current half 
year. " Royal Commission Report, evidence given in England, 
p . 116 . 
20 Times of India, July 14, 1865, as quoted by Ra dhe 
Shyam Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations in India, 1851-
19 00 (Cambridge;-1TTof,p. 89. - --
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directors, deluded by the promise of returning prosperity, 
wanted to wait for a better price. Some , especially those 
who had engaged in share speculation, felt that a deluge of 
shares such as the Bank held, onto the market, would cause 
another panic. 
The bank secretary Robertson explained how he was able 
to dispose of some of his bank shares through Premchund. He 
remembered a conversation in June 1865 when he asked Premchund: 
"I want you to sell all my shares. I want to get rid 
of all my shares;" which even then would have given me a 
very good return. I said, with reference to the Bank of 
Bombay shares , "They are very much down now, and I want 
to get out of them." They were at a par, I believe. He 
said , "The best thing for you to do is to take so many 
more to make an average." I consented, telling him that 
immediately the shares got up to a certain price I would 
tell him to hand them over. There was no writing, and 
no acknowledgement in any way. I never got a share in my 
possession; and in September or October 1865, when the 
shares were at about 70 rupees a share, I made a calcula-
tion, and found that with some money which he, or rather 
his nephew, who was conducting business for him, and for 
whom h e was responsible, owed me for shares, I should be 
c lear; and I said to him, "These shares must be handed 
over at such a price, which clears me the amount." He 
said, "Do not yo u want to make any money out of them?" 
I said "No, I want to get rid of them." He said "Very 
we ll, they shall be handed over;" and the account was made 
up in that way. I got some shares in the Bombay Reclama-
tion Company. It was in September 1865, when the shares 
were at 7 or 8 per cent premium, and I considered them 
at an end. 1121 
21 
Royal Commission Report, evidence given in England, 
p . 122. ---
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If Robertson had acted in a like manner for the bank 
many losses would have been avoided. 
l os t which never would occur again. 
An opportunity had been 
In October the Bombay Chamber of Commerce issued its 
annual report for 1865. It opened with the statement: 
The official year just closed will be notable in the 
history of Bombay as a year hitherto unparalleled in 
its commercial annals for the reckless spirit of gamb-
ling speculation which possessed a great portion of the 
community; speculation which resulted to large numbers--
a s might be expected from its character--in utter ruin 
and disgrace. 22 
The report went on to state that the unexpected wealth 
which had poured into the lap of Western India by the inci-
de nt of the American Civil War had not been used wisely. The 
mani a for share speculation which had broken out two years 
before, had continued to grow in intensity until it seemed 
to absorb the time and attention of the community. The 
l eg itimate trade of Bombay came to be neglected, and the 
ene rgies of the people had been devoted to the promulgation 
of s chemes the utility of which to the public was probably 
the last thing thought worthy of consideration by the pro-
mo t e rs. Bombay became flooded with "Financial Associations" 
and doubtful schemes of reclamation. When the mania was at 
22 Raymond Sulivan, One Hundred Years of Bombay 1836-
193 6 (Bombay, 1937), pp. 74-75. 
76 
i t s height, intelligence was received of the unexpected 
te rmination of the American Civil War, and the gambling 
speculation suddenly collapsed, and insolvency and bankruptcy 
fo llowe d on a scale of magnitude unknown in any other crisis 
of mode rn share speculation. So numerous were the insolven-
cies and so enormous were the amounts involved, that the 
Chamber of Commerce report stated that it had requested the 
Legis lature to give power to creditors to secure a more 
speedy liq uidation of insolvent estates. 
The report ended by declaring that the high position 
which Bombay p reviously had bore among the commercial cities 
of the world had been lowered by the gambling transactions. 
It re solutely state d however that the genuine trade of the 
place was at bottom thoroughly sound, and it depended on no 
adventitious circumstances of any kind for its prosperity, 
and n ow that the false line of wild speculation had been 
remove d, the Chamber of Commerce had every reason to hope that 
the c omme rc e of Bombay would be placed on a sounder and 
broade r basi s than it had e ver known. 
On September 8, 1865 Sir Charles Wood wrote to the 
Gove r nme nt of Bombay to acknowledge the receipt of their 
l ette r of July 8, 1865. This dispatch which Frere forwarded 
to the Bank of Bomb ay, and there termed by Hannay to be a 
"most t y rannical communication," directed the Bombay Gove rnment 
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to take measures for making an alteration to Act X of 1863 
which would preclude the bank from advancing on the security 
of shares of public companies not guaranteed by the Govern-
ment . It further stated : 
Bu t above all, it should be the care of the Govern-
ment directors to wa tch very closely the proceedings 
of the bank, in order, so far as their influence 
extends, to prevent any repetition of imprudent manage-
me nt; and any disposition on the part of their colleagues 
to depart from sound principles should be forthwith com-
municated to you, in order that you may take such measures 
as may seem to you to be necessary in reference there to. 23 
On November , 1865, the directors replied: 
The Secretary of State h as either been much misinformed 
relative to the transactions of the Bank of Bombay, or 
e lse has quite misunderstood the information supplied. 
The Bank of Bombay has never advanced money directly 
on shares, but during the crisis that occurred in the 
early part of this year the times were so exceptional 
that the directors considered it prudent, seeing so 
much money was l ent on personal security only, to obtain 
as much collateral security as possible when granting 
loans. Thi s was done, and it enabled the bank to 
assist many of their constituents who possessed shares 
in sound undertakings and of undoubted value, but re-
quired money.24 
The Directors continued by saying that upon calmly looking at 
the circumstances of the past they be lieved that, had any 
othe r course been adopted, the result would have been most 
disastrous; and had the Government directors not given their 
23 · Royal Commission Report, evidence given in England, 
pp . 21 1-212. 
24 Ibid., p. 117. 
consent to the course commented on, they would have been 
responsible for ruin, probably more general and widespread 
than had ever been seen before in any city or commercial 
community. Referring to the alteration of the Charter, the 
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directors said that it was a matter over which they had no 
con trol, but since they knew that the clause referred to had 
never been taken advantage of, they did not see that any 
change was either necessary or desirable. 
The statement by the directors that they had never 
advanced money on shares is untrue; the resolution of April 
12, 1865 had enabled the Secretary of the bank to make such 
advances . When questioned by the Royal Commissioners on 
this point, Hannay explained th a t "we always considered that 
.,25 
we had the security of the applicant as well as the shares. 
In December, 1865 cotton prices dropped again and the 
hope which had been evident in the fall that the financial 
crisis would soon end, now vanished. Just before Christmas, 
Frere , then at Sholapoor, a few hundred miles from Bombay , 
received word from Lushing ton that t he bank was in trouble 
and that suspension seemed imminent. Lushington reported 
that the bank had only 6.7 lakhs (/ 60 ,750) available in coin. 
Frere set out at once for Bombay, arriving the morning of· 
25 b'd I l ., p. 248. 
December 26. After meeting with the bank directors Frere 
discovered that the lack of coin was not so much the fault 
of the Bank of Bombay as of the Government Treasury and 
Curre ncy Department at Calcutta who had sent the bank bills 
instead of the desired coins. The reason the bank had re-
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q uested coins was related to the cotton situation. In times 
p ast the local cotton merchant bought from the cultivator on 
c r e dit and sold the cotton again on credit to a Bombay merchant 
--the money not being realized until the English importer 
paid for the cotton, often many months hence. The risk of 
s uch long credit was now thought to be poor and so the rural 
me rchants were selling only for cash. In some cotton dis-
tricts bank notes were not used and so this necessitated a 
l a rge r amount of coin to be available at the bank. Apparently 
t he bank had warned Calcutta of this need for coin, but their 
r equests had been ignored. Luckily this crisis being only 
acc ide ntal, was temporary. 
On January 23, 1866 the bank directors met and re-
solved to pay an eight per cent dividend (totalling 8,36,000 
r upees) to all shareholders for the six month period ending 
Decembe r 31, 1865. At this same meeting the directors 
appo inte d a committee to investigate the debts outstanding 
a t t h e bank (the 30 lakhs declared lost in August, 1865) 
a nd dec ide the total amount which they deemed to be irrecoverable . 
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Why the directors did not wait to decide to declare a divi-
dend until after this report had been received is but another 
e xample of their imprudent acti on. The Commission Report 
reckoned the bank's statement to be as follows: 
Profits of 1865 
Reserve fund 
Losses computed in 
~~ 3 0 , 6 9 , 9 6 7 
fi s 10,56,983 
August 1865 /\':-. 30, 00, 000 
Add dividend for half 
year f,'< 8 ,36,000 
Balance of reserve fund 
,o ~ 4 1 , 2 4 , 9 5 0 
' 38,36,00026 
I~ 2,88 ,00 0 
When q uestioned by the Commission as to the judicious-
ness of s uch a payment , Robertson said that the directors 
"were anxio us to pay a dividend on account of the shareholde rs," 
a nd fur ther reflected that, "perhaps in one sense it might 
have been an advantage to the shareholders, because if the 
money had not been paid to them it would probably have been 
t hrown away like the rest; but that is the only way in which 
27 I can look at it as a prudent measure." 
The Government of India had, on January 13, 1866, 
addressed a lette r to the Bombay Government which noted that 
six months had now e lapsed since the bank, in a critical 
26 rbid. , Summary , p. 33. 
27 rbid., evidence given in England, p. 117. 
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s t a te, had called for Government permission to advance money 
if needed from the currency reserve and had received that 
pe rmission. Lawrence continued by pointing out that since 
t h a t date no substantial improvement seemed to have taken 
p l a ce in e ither the condition or the management of the bank. 
lle went on: 
the Governor General in council is of opinion 
that an examination into the affairs of the bank should 
no longer be delayed, with a view to such a revision of 
the terms upon which its business has been, and is con-
ducted , as may seem expedient. The Governor General in 
~ouncil considers that the examination should comprise 
an investigation, not only into the assets and floating 
liabilities of the bank, but into its transactions 
especially during the past six months. In conclusion, 
his Excellency in council hopes that a full report on 
the several matters above referred to will be furnished 
by your Government without unnecessary delay.28 
The reply to Lawrence's letter was drafted by Govern-
ment directors , Francis Chapman and G. Norman. It was dated 
Ma rch 31, 1866, but did not reach the Governor General until 
J une . The following are extracts from this report: 
Th e first of July (1865) found the bank with very 
many of its formerly best constituents either insolvent 
or embarrassed . It was plainly seen that unless a 
gene ral policy of forebearance was exercised, loans which 
would, in all probabi lity, prove ultimately good, would, 
if the parties were pressed, result in immediate and 
heavy loss. 
On the 30th June (1865) the amount lent from the head 
of fic e was 321 lakhs, and on the 30th December, 313"lakhs. 
28 Ibid., p. 212. 
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Of the former amount 79 lakhs had been realized up to 
the 30th December, and 126 were overdue. The process 
of recovery has, it must be admitted, been slow, but 
then the very grea t delay attendant on all legal pro-
ceedin gs in Bombay, and the fact that the largest of 
the bank 's debtors have not yet realized the proceeds 
of the current year's investments in cotton and other 
produce , must not be overlooked. We beg further 
to report tha t the total amount of loans and discounts 
outstanding on the 30th December at both the head office 
and branches was 381 lakhs of rupees; that out of this 
163 lakhs of rupee s are overdue, and that 30 lakhs have, 
afte r a careful and impartial scrutiny, been set down 
as the amount of the probable eventual losses. From 
the balance sheet, a copy of which is annexed, it will 
be observed the bank will, after allowing for all 
losses , and after having paid a half-year's dividend 
at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum, be possessed of 
about three lakhs in excess of its capital .... 
The operations of the bank, not only during the past 
six but during the past ten months, will, we believe, 
bear the strictest scrutiny; and there is no prospect 
of the loss of a rupee on a single new transaction 
e ntered into during that period. 
With regard to the future, the only practical dif-
ference between the charter granted to this bank and 
that granted to the Bank of Bengal is that contained 
in sec tion 32 of Bombay Act X of 1863, authorizing 
advances being made on shares; and we have reason to 
bel i eve that the directors would have no objections 
to its being expunged, as for the last ten months this 
powe r has never been made use of.29 
It was unfortunate that Norman and Chapman had been 
chose n to draft the above report. Norman had just rece ntly 
become a director and Chapman had never been employed in a 
bank before (he stated before the Commission that he wished 
29 rbid., Summary, p. 34. 
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he had never been in this one). The Commission report found 
t ha t these directors did not search into matters deeply enough 
and took fa r too sanguine a view in estimating expected losses 
rom overdue loans. It po inted out that: 
"The statement that there was no prospect of the loss 
of a rupee on the transactions of the last ten months, 
unfortunately proved incorrect, and would never have 
been made, if the Government directors had understood 
the danger of advancing upon such personal security as 
the bank was stil l in the habit of taking," and further, 
" the last statement, that the power given by 
section 32 of Act X of 1863 had never been made use of 
during the last ten months, was singularly inaccurate. 
During those ten months, from the 1st June 1865 to the 
31st March 1866, there had been no less than 25 advances 
direct ly on shares, irrespective of numerous other trans-
ac tions in which shares had been taken as security, sub-
sequently to the advances being made. 11 30 
The directors of the Bank of Bombay committed one 
last error during this period . In March 1866, Hannay about 
to depart for England, received a request from the director s 
o de fine the powers of the Secretary. In turn, Hannay wrote 
o the Secretary , Robertson, asking him to state what he felt 
his duties were. Robertson replied on March 7, 1866: 
I consider that according to the practice in the Bank 
for some years past, I, as officiating secretary, am 
e mpowe red to act as follows: 
1. To have the entire control of the establishment, 
head office, and branches (of course under the 
directors ) 
JO Ibid ., p. 35. 
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2 • To discount b a nk bills and bills 
currency not exceeding 60 days. 
b ut I h ave hitherto seldem (sic) 
lacs of the paper of one house 
on good houses of a 
There is no limit, 
taken over three 
3 . To grant temporary advances to banks, houses, and 
other constituents of the bank 
4. To discount bills, and to grant loans and credits 
on persona l security to well known men 
N.B. Since I have been acting, the times have been so 
e xcep tional, that I granted very few advances without 
consulting at least one director. 
5 . The renewal of bill, loans, and credits, I consider 
is left to my own discretion, of course bearing in 
mind the order of the board, not to renew for the 
full amount if possible, but to get 25 % in cash. 
Some bills, etc. for special reasons have been 
renewed in full. 
6 . To purc h ase hoondies for the purpose of providing 
branches with funds 
7. To purchase and sell bills on Calcutta and Madras 
8. To p urchase and sell gold and silver bullion 
9. Power given in July last to attend meetings of 
creditors of parties indebted to the Bank; to agree 
to propositions made at such meetings; to sign trust 
deeds, etc. at my discretion. 
I think these headings include everything. I may say 
that I consider the order of the President in every case 
sufficient for me to act under, should he not request me 
to refer any matter to some of the other members of the 
board.3 1 
Thus Robertson be lieved that he had great powers, and 
Hannay who then wrote to the directors, did not dispute this. 
31 rb id., Appendix, Exhibit A35. 
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He f urther stated that he believed that Robertson's capabili-
ties as secretary were excellen t and agreed almost fully with 
wh a t Robertson had written. Thereupon the board of directors 
adopte d Hannay's letter as the proper duties of the office 
and this letter was embodied on March 19, 1866 in the only 
bye l a ws ever passed by bank officials defining the secretary's 
powe rs. These byelaws unfortunately were never sent to the 
Gove rnment of India for sanction, and so never became valid. 
Hannay retired from his post as president early in 
Ap ril 1866 and Lidderdale ass umed the position. Hannay had 
bee n an industrious president, but as he was himself mixed 
up in the speculative game , he did little to help the bank 
re c over losses or institute sound business procedures. Sub-
sequently, in the next period of the bank's history , from 
April 24 to December 10, 1866, the ruin of the bank was 
c ompleted. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FAILURE OF THE BANK OF BOMBAY 
AND AFTERMATH (1866-1868) 
The dire ctors of the bank during this crucial period 
were Fr ancis Lidde rdale and J. Lushington , successively presi-
dents , A. Brown, A. Stewart, R. Tracey, G.M. Stewart , Macdonald, 
Comme rci a l Dire ctors, and G. Norman and Charles E. Chapman, 
Gove rnme nt Dire ctors. Each of these men neglected his duty 
to the b a n k and b y doing so completed its ruin. 
P r e mchund Roy chund, the foremost speculator in Bombay 
whose r eputati o n one writer has characterized as " the most 
renown ed alche mist who can turn dust into the yellow metal 
and who by his magic wand, transmuted the sands of Back Bay 
into the solid nugge ts of gold where with to pave the way to 
pa r a di se , 111 on April 26, 1866 needed the sum of 25 lakhs 
(; 25 0,000) to pre vent his stopping payment. He was indebted 
to a lmos t all the major banks and he applied to Robertson at 
the Ba nk of Bombay for these 25 lakhs. Robertson informed 
Lidde rdale, the new president, who then summoned a special 
meeti n g o f the directors to discuss this loan. As any 
l S.D. Me hta, The Cotton Mills of .!_ndia 1854-1954 
(Bombay , 1954), p. 2g:-
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stopp ag e by Pre mchund would be a catastrophe to all banks in 
Bombay , Lidderdale also invited the managers of the Oriental , 
Ch a rte red Mercantile, Asiatic and the Bank of Hindustan to 
a t te nd this meeting . 
Lidderdale presented Premchund's request before the 
ga the r e d bankers. There apparently was little discussion , 
fo r everyone felt that Premchund would have to be assisted 
or e ls e they all would fail with him. No statement of 
Premc hund's affairs was brought forward, but the group 
ag r e eing that they should have one, adjo u rned until the 
fo llowing morning. 
At seven a.m . on April 27, 1866 the bankers met again, 
th i s time at Lidderdale's home. Additional banke rs from 
the Comptoir d'Escompte and the Commercial Bank were in 
at t e ndance. On this occas ion Premchund himse l f was present, 
t h o ugh he remained on the porch and answered questions put to 
h i m by Robertson or Tracey who occasionally came out of the 
mee ting. A rough statement outlining Premchund's affairs 
was drawn up at this meeting. It was not verified since 
tho s e present felt there was no time for any investigation as 
Premchund seemed most pressed for the money . It was not even 
veri fi e d a s to whether if the 25 lakhs were advanced that 
the a mount would be sufficient to cover Premchund's needs. 
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As for securities, Premchund proposed to deposit his 
jewe ls, said to be worth from 15 to 20 lakhs, the title deeds 
to h i s landed property holdings, and to give a joint promis-
sory note together with his father Roychund, Candass Narrondas, 
a n d Kursondass Madhowdass. 
A memorandum which resulted from the meeting estimated 
the value of Premchund's jewels at 20 lakhs. No verification 
was made of this figure. 
The value of the landed property was estimated in this 
memo r a ndum to be some 26 lakhs. This was in spite of the 
f ct th a t G. Norman a Government director , who as collector 
of l a nd revenue in Bombay was familiar with land prices on 
the island, e stimated the property to be worth only 14 lakhs. 
Even Robertson, in a letter written at this time, estimated 
2 t h e land to be worth only 18 lakhs. Those present discussed 
the value of the land and in the course of their discussion 
Tracey l e ft the meeting several times to verify certain 
ho l d ing s with Premchund. After one such communication, Prem-
chund who apparently did not like such an examination, cleverly 
told Tracey that "if they wanted to make a bother I would 
rathe r stop payment, and that if they made any difficulty· 
abou t the s e curit i es I would give them the names of three 
2Royal Commission Report, Appendix, Exhibit Q, p. 86. 
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other parties as guarantees ." 3 When Tracey returned with 
th is statement the directors felt they had better complete 
the matter quickly to avoid Premchund stopping payment, and 
so took the "additional precaution in the interests of the 
shar e holders"
4 
of having a joint promissory note signed by 
Premchund Roychund, Roychund Deepchund, Candass Marondass, 
and Kursondass Madhowdass drawn up. 
And so it was agreed that a loan of 25 lakhs should 
be g ranted to Premchund for six months on the basis of the 
security offered. The Bank of Bombay agreed to subscribe 
10 1/2 lakhs, the Oriental,Chartered Mercantile, Asiatic, 
and Commercial Banks and the Comptoir d'Escompte should each 
subscribe 2 1 /2 lakhs, and the Bank of Hindustan, 2 lakhs. 
The Bank of Bombay agreed to advance the full sum, which was 
t h en to be recouped by the other banks in the amounts desig-
nated . 
President Lidderdale directed the bank's solicitor, 
Kel l y , to prepare a deed to carry out this agreement--but 
ne ithe r Kelly nor the secretary, Robertson, made any memoran-
dum or minute of the arrangement that had been entered into. 
The signatures of the bank managers present at this meeting 
3Ibid., evidence given in India, p. 89. 
4Lidde rdale so characterized this note. Ibid., p. 19. 
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had not been taken, nor had all the stipulated security been 
handed over by Premchund. Nevertheless that same afternoon 
(April 27) ,Premchund received a draw of the loan. 
Not only had Robertson failed in his duty as bank 
secretary to see that some agreement had been signed by all 
the parties involved before the bank advanced any money, but 
Robertson also failed to inform the directors of the tru e 
state of Premchund's account with the bank. For already on 
April 26, Premchund had been indebted to the bank for the 
sum of 23 1/2 lakhs. Included in this amount was a 5 lakh 
overdraw on his account as well as an outstanding loan of 9 
lakhs. Robertson knew of this, as did Tracey who in fact had 
been Premchund 's business partner in many financial specula-
tions. The other directors under testimony to the Royal 
Commission, stated that they did not know that Premchund had 
this liability in addition to the difficulties for which he 
needed 25 lakhs. Had they been aware of this they undoubtedly 
wou ld have required Premchund to give further security for 
enlarging his debt. Unfortunately Tracey and Robertson had 
not been disposed to give out this information. Premchund 
testified to the Commission that he had only been questioned 
as to his pressing liabilities for which he presented the· 
directors with a rough memorandum; as for his affairs generally, 
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he had given no statement as none had been asked for. 5 
The extent of Tracey's dealings with Premchund were 
revea l ed at the Commission hearings. Tracey and Premchund 
had jointly engaged in speculations, with Premchund supplying 
Tracey with money to such a degree that at one time Tracey 
owed Premchund 29 lakhs (~ 290,000). This large debt was 
mostly paid off, though in November 1865 Tracey had been 
fo rced to write off a loan of 3.8 lakhs which he owed to 
Premchund. In early April 1866 Tracey had borrowed 4.5 lakhs 
from the Asiatic Bank in the name of his firm (Ritchie, 
Stewart and Co.) for Premchund. On April 19 Tracey gave the 
Bank of Bombay a guarantee for Premchund's overdrawn account 
o the extent of 3 lakhs. This guarantee, in the light of 
Tracey 's financial situation, was utterly worthless, yet 
Robertso n accepted it. After the 25 lakh loan had been 
granted to Premchund, Robertson asked Tracey if a portion 
of it should not be used to pay the overdraft,but Tracey said 
not . And still Robertson did not inform the directors of 
Premchund's true financial standing. 
On April 27 some of the title deeds of the landed 
prope rty of Premchund's security had been deposited with the 
bank . This same day the bank paid out 11 lakhs to Premchund . 
5 rbid., p. 89. 
.... 
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The next day a further sum of 4.5 lakhs had been paid to the 
Asiatic Bank ; this discharged the debt which Tracey had in-
u rred for Premchund and part ly explains the reason he helped 
Premchund obtain the 25 lakh loan. 
Premchund deposited some of the jewels that formed a 
part of his security at the bank on April 29. Fraser, a bank 
off icial, accepted them and called in Cou rvoisier, a local 
jewel l e r to estimate their value. Courvoisier looked over 
t hese jewels and said they were worth between 2 and 3 lakhs. 
Frase r being very much disturbed at this low estimate went to 
i nform the directors. He stopped in the secretary's room 
fi rst, and there meeting Robertson and Tracey, told them of 
the low valuation . Fraser then did not go into the board room 
to tell the directors , believing that either Robertson or 
Tracey would do so. Notwithstanding the importance of this 
news , it was not communicated to the directors and Robertson 
continued to advance money to Premchund. 
Premchund Roychund failed in August 1866 and the 
securities the bank had t aken proved wholly insuffi c i e nt. 
Th e jewe ls were sold in England and India and realized only 
2 . 5 lakhs . The l anded property brought in 5.2 lakhs. The 
. h h i· t . tt 6 promissory note was not wort t e paper was wri en upon. 
6Roychund Deepchund evaded payment and absconded into 
the Guicowar ' s country . Candass Narrondass was Premchund's 
93 
Ma n y of the bank managers who had been present at the meeting 
a t Lidderdale's home repudiated the transaction which they h ad 
a greed to and refused to reimburse the Bank of Bombay for 
the ir p a rt of the 25 lakh loan . The balance which Premchund 
owed the Bank of Bombay, the Commission computed to be 24.7 
l akhs (X247,369); the sum proved to be irrecoverable. 
Shortly after making the large loan to Premchund, the 
Bank of Bombay had determined to aid the Asiatic Bank. The 
As iatic Bank rivaled the Bank of Bombay both in fostering 
the s pe culation mania in Bombay and in its reckless business 
p r ocedures. The Asiatic Bank had been formed in 1863 but 
the prosperous times and i nfluential management soon caused 
th i s bank to be the most formidab l e competitor of the Bank of 
Bombay which had been chartered some twenty-three years before. 
Much like the Bank of Bombay, the Asiatic, because of the 
e x ceptional times, made large advances on a variety of 
q u e stionable securities. It was the banker of the Bombay 
Re clamation Company and Premchund Roychund was involved in 
de alings and promotions with the Asiatic. 
The Bank of Bombay had often loaned money to other 
banks in Bombay. In May 1866 the Asiatic, finding itself.in 
tool and passed through the Insolvent Court of Bombay. Kur-
sondass Madhowdass failed on May 16, 1866 and his trustees 
rep u d iate d any liability on the promissory note. Ibi~., 
Summary , p. 38. 
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difficulty, applied for such a loan. Much the same fear 
that had prompted the directors to lend money to Premchund, 
that is that the failure of one bank would lead to the failure 
of many others, led the directors to grant a credit of 15 
lakhs to the Asiatic Bank. On May 14, 1866 the Asiatic ob-
tained this cash credit after depositing certain securities 
and promising that more would follow. As if this were not 
enough a week later the Asiatic still finding itself in 
difficulty applied for, and was given an additional 5 lakh 
loan. 
On July 13 when the first cash credit expired, the 
Asiatic owed the Bank of Bombay 11.7 lakhs (i117,883). so 
far the Asiatic had sent in only one lakh of security to 
cover the loan. Thus the Bank of Bombay necessarily was 
forced to extend this loan with the hope that the Asiatic 
would somehow recover and be able to pay it off. September 
1 was the new deadline and the Asiatic Bank agreed to deposit 
new securities. In late August the directors discovered 
that one such security for five lakhs had never been received. 
They called in Anthony Morrison, the manager of the Asiatic 
for an explanation and he apparently satisfied their ques-
tions, for in substitution for these five lakhs, further 
security was given. 
When the second credit expired on September 1, the 
Asiatic owed the Bank of Bombay 16.8 lakhs (l l 68 ,282). The 
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few securities which the Bank of Bombay held proved to be 
either not negotiable or almost worthless. It seemed thal. 
Robertson, the bank secretary and a close iriend of Morrison, 
knew that the majority of the promised security had not been 
sent to the Bank cf Bombay. But he never told President 
Lushington of this. In spite of the expiration of the c ash 
credit on September 1, Robertson allowed the Asi a tic to con-
tinue drawing money from the Bank of Bombay up to September 
20 on which day the Asiatic failed. The net cons e quence of 
the transactions was that when the Asiatic failed, it owed 
19 . 6 lakhs {r/196,656) to the Bank of Bombay.
7 
It was anocher c ase oi bad banking and bad bookkeeping. 
The accountant J. De Ga had kept Robertson informed almost 
daily as to the status of the Asiatic ' s account and never 
passed a check unless authorized to do so. One such communi-
cation is presented in the Commission's findings: 
Asiatic Bank's account is already overdrawn by Rupees 
18,09,761; shall I pay this cheque for Rs 51,498? 
(Signed) J.M. De Ga 
Pro-Accountant 
7 
'The real loser when the Asiatic failed however, was 
the Bombay Reclamation Company for which the Asiatic had 
served as banker. Some 91 lakhs of the Company ' s deposits 
were lost, and the Company was put into liquidation in 
November 1866. 





Robertson seriously neglected his duty by not informing either 
the directors or the president of such overdrafts. The presi-
dent and the directors never bothered to check the ledgers 
for themselves, and simply trusted that Robertson would tell 
them of such a situation. The result was as in the case of 
Premchund's failure, that the money could not be recovered. 
Meanwhile after an unexplainable delay the last report 
of the Bank of Bombay's Government directors dated March 31, 
1866 reached the Governor General on June 16, 1866. Lawrence 
replied to their communication in a letter dated July 13. In 
it he stated that the embarrassments of the bank were attri-
butable to the abuse of powers which never should have been 
conferred on it by charter. He noted that the Government of 
Bombay had proposed to correct this error and to procure 
sounder management for the bank, but he added: 
The Governor General in council, though fully sharing 
in the desire of the Bombay Government to uphold the 
credit of the Bank, cannot surfer lhe revenues of India 
to be indefinitely pledged to the support of an establish-
ment of the affairs of which he is kept in ignorance. · 
The information furnished by the report of the directors 
contains little more than is to be found in the general 
8 Royal Commission Report, Appendix, Exhibit A31, p. 30. 
statements of assets and liabilities published in the 
newspapers.9 
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Lawrence requested a listing of the banks, firms, and indi-
viduals to which the bank was under advance, as well as the 
dates and amounts of such advances, and the securities upon 
which they had been granted, and the sums advanced on each 
security. 
The Bombay Government postponed answering these ques-
tions from the Governor General. In testimony before the 
Hoyal Commission Frere said that he had considered that there 
was no practical way of responding to Lawrence's inquiry lest 
he send all of the bank's records up to Simla and such action 
he felt wouid surely have destroyed the bank. He felt that 
the bank was still solvent and such a request and its impli-
cations would have caused the directors to resign en masse 
and so destroy the bank. Frere asked the Commission to con-
sider that "when you are in the height of a storm, it is not 
the time to inquire whether the captain was wise in putting 
to sea, or whether some better seamanship might have avoided 
the ship getting into danger. 1110 
9rbid., evidence given in England, p. 213. 
lOibid., p. 214. 
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On August 6, 1866 the annual general meeting of the 
shareholders of the Bank of Bombay was held. The report issued 
for the shareholders hedged on pertinent issues; it set forth 
that the capital had been encroached upon to the extent of 
50 lakhs, without admitting that the sum to be the total loss 
incurred, or that it was a loss in addition to the 30 lakhs 
announced previously. 
The Bombay Government appeared now to have understood 
the real status of the bank and were anxious to have some 
disinterested party give an accurate opinion as to the bank's 
position. As a prominent member of the Financial Department 
of the Government of India, E.F. Harrison, was then visiting 
Bombay, he seemed to be the perfect choice to head an investi-
gating committee. Frere, wishing not to have the confidence 
in the bank lost, requested the directors to apply to Lawrence 
for a committee to review their estimate of the losses set 
forth in the annual report. The directors complied with the 
Governor's request, and formed a committee consisting of 
Harrison, A.J. Hunter, a reputable merchant who had abstained 
from share speculation, and Dinshaw Manockjee, a wealthy 
native, also free from the taint of speculation. 
On September 8, 1866 these three gentlemen submitted 
their report to the Governor of Bombay. They were of the 
opinion that the valuation of June 30, 1866 by the directo~s 
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of the Bank of Bombay was fair and had been carried out with 
care; but they were also of the opinion that a large addi-
tion must be made to the estimate of the bank's losses. This 
addition they said, should be no less than 34.4 lakhs (r./344,950 ) . 
Frere forwarded the committee's report to the Government 
of India on September 19, 1866. On October 3 the Government 
of India telegraphed Bombay asking to see the detailed state-
ment of the bank's account--the statement which the committee 
had considered "proof of the fairness and care with which (the 
directors] estimated the position of the bank [on June 30, 
1866] . 1111 The Government of Bombay asked for this statement 
at the bank, but Robertson refused to hand it over, replying 
that the statement "contained information with reference to 
the committee's estimates which the directors alone could 
understand, and that the directors therefore considered it 
d 11 12 h unnecessary to forwar a copy to Government. Te Government 
of Bombay took no further steps to obtain a copy of this 
statement for Lawrence. 
Meanwhile Lawrence continued to write Frere, reminding 
him that the request of July 13, 1866 for a detailed listing 
of the bank's advances still remained unanswered. 
11Ibid., p. 220. 
12 Ibid., Summary, p. 43. 
Frere,. 
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disinclined to press the bank for this information, still 
believing that the bank would suffer a loss of confidence, 
now felt that the committee report was a sufficient reply. 
But Lawrence continued to press for detailed information--
the discrepancy between the committee report and the annual 
bank report--rendered this necessary. On October 3 he wrote 
a letter to the Bombay Government that he felt it was the 
duty of the Government of India as the largest shareholder 
in the bank, and as trustee of the treasury balances in their 
custody to require the full exposition of the bank's affairs. 
The reply to the Governor General's letter, dated 
October 22, 1866, again reiterated the hazards involved if 
such an inquiry were made and the confidence of the bank 
lost as a result. Nevertheless Frere did write that he 
would direct that a statement be prepared and submitted as 
soon as possible. Then, he added, if the Government of India 
still was not satisfied, they should select men to make an 
inquiry into the bank's accounts. Frere obviously felt he 
was being tormented unnecessarily by Lawrence to furnish 
detailed information; he complained to Wood: 
We have asked the Government of India, if they want 
more inquiry into the past, to nominate independent 
commissioners to inquire here; but as nothing has eveL 
been charged against the directors worse than the almost 
incredible mismanagement, folly, and extravagance from 
which so many banks have suffered at the same time in 
their rivalry for custom, and as the directors and 
secretary of that day have all left, I hardly see the 
us e of further inquiry.13 
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The statement which Frere promised Lawrence was sent 
to the Government of India on November 23, 1866. The informa-
tion it presented was worthless. It listed only advances 
which exceeded three lakhs which had been overdue on June 30, 
1866. It avoided al l mention of sums below that amount or 
any advances that had been renewed (because they were over-
due)--most of these were for more than three lakhs. It 
failed to list both Premchund's great loan of 25 l akhs (for 
it was not due on June 30, 1866!) and the 19 lakhs due from 
the Asiatic (the cash credit expired on September 1, 1866). 
The Royal Commission Report commented that "a more unsatis-
14 
factory report could scarcely have been formed." 
Lawrence certain l y acted judiciously from the time he 
first learne d of the bank's difficulties. It was well within 
the duty of the Gove rnment of India as guardian of the public 
balance in the bank to ascertain the true position of the 
bank and make any inquiries necessary in forming this opinion. 
It is actually quite improbable that any of the directors 
would have resigned if such an inquiry had been instituted, 
13 Ibid., Appendix, Exhibit Al95, pp. 79-80. 
14 Ibid., Summary , p. 43. 
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for by the summer of 1866 the directors though still incompe-
tent as bankers, were not involved in speculation as previous 
directors had been. However by now the position of the Bank 
of Bombay could no longer be helped, though the ultimate 
disaster of cours e could have been lessened somewhat. 
In October the Bombay Chamber of Commerce published 
its annual report. The report declared, "the official year 
closes amid gloom and depression, after a commercial and bank-
ing panic more intense in character and protracted in opera-
tion than has hitherto been known in the history of Bombay. 1115 
The report denied rumors which had hinted that members of 
the Chamber of Commerce were among promotors of the specula-
tion and said that few if any of the mushroom concerns had 
ever become members of the Chamber. The verdict of one 
journalist was included: "there have been commercial panics 
elsewhere; but probably no community ever went so entirely 
mad as Bombay did in 1865. 1116 
Reginald Smith described the year as one filled with 
great commercial disasters, stagnation of trade, famine and 
scarcity. He criticized the Bank of Bombay as the worst 
offender of all, which fostered and spread the speculation 
15 Raymond J. F. Sulivan, One Hundred Years of Bombay 
1836-1936 (Bombay, 1937), p. 75. 
16rbid., pp. 76-77. 
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in spite of repeated warnings from Lord Lawrence. 17 
Another contemporary said: 
In 1866 when the gains and losses were reckoned up, 
the fortunes could be counted on the fingers of one's 
hands while the dead and wounded literally strewed 
the field of battle.18 
Though surrounded with failures and losses, somehow 
the Bank of Bombay managed to survive until January 1868. 
During its final year of existence little happened, for the 
bank now ruined, was virtually in liquidation. On January 
15, 1867 at a special meeting of the shareholders, the capi-
tal of the bank was reduced fifty per cent. This meant that 
the nominal value of a share was now 500 rupees, but as the 
public confidence in the bank had been lost, shares began to 
be sold in the market at 250 rupees each. 
At this same time John Stuart, a former secretary of 
the bank under the previous charter, returned to Bombay and 
became secretary once again. The directors had meanwhile 
prepared a statement listing all the outstanding debts due 
the bank and during meetings on January 30 and 31, 1867 con-
cluded that one-half of the bank's capital still remained 
intact. The directors spent the remainder of the year 
17Reginald Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence (New 
York, 1883), II, pp. 416-417. 
18 James Douglas, as q uoted in S.D. Mehta, The Cotton 
Mills of India, ~- cit., p. 32. 
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attempting to realize the assets they claimed the bank had--
their search turned out to be futile. It was an almost 
impossible task to lay claim to any of the estates of debtors 
to the bank who had been declared insolvent. This situation 
occurred because of a poor legislative enactment (Act XXVIII 
of 1865) which slowed down the processing of these cases to 
such an extent that only two estates were settled under it 
by September 1868. 
In February 1867 the bank underwent another severe 
run on its funds, with 1,69,00,000 rupees &11,690,000) being 
withdrawn within a few days. The Government of India again 
came to the bank's rescue by assuring that the bank would 
be supported with Governmental funds if needed. As in the 
run of June 1865, the Government's action effectively stopped 
further withdrawals of deposits. 
But as the months went by it became more and more 
apparent that the debts outstanding to the bank could not be 
regained. At the general meeting of the shareholders held 
on August 5, 1867 the directors presented a statement declaring 
that the last six months of operations had been most unfavor-
ab le ones owing to the run on the bank and the undecided 
claims against insolvent estates. They estimated a loss of 
capital amounting to one and one-half crore (£ 1,500,000). 
The Bank of Bombay limped along in this deplorable 
state until at a general meeting of shareholders on January 
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13, 1868 those present resolved to voluntarily wind up the 
bank. Stuart, the secretary, was appointed liquidator. 
The shareholders, many of whom were Civil Servants both 
in India and in England who had invested their savings in the 
bank, were now quick to fix the blame for the bank's failure 
on the Government of Bombay. The English shareholders 
brought a charge of corruption against the directors of the 
bank. Wood accordingly directed Lawrence to appoint a Com-
mission to inquire into the causes of the bank's failure and 
to issue a report on its findings. The Commission which 
Lawrence organized consisted of Sir Charles Jackson, a former 
judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature in Bombay, as Presi-
dent, Major MacLeod Innes, Mi l itary Accountant-General with 
the Government of India, and Maxwell Melville of the Bombay 
Civil Service. This Commission gathered evidence, first in 
India (June 29-September 9, 1868), and then in England 
(November 9-December 11, 1868). 
appeared before the Commission. 
Some ninety-six witnesses 
The Commission performed its duties expeditiously and 
19 submitted a comprehensive report on February 10, 1869. 
19 Royal Commissions of Inquiry had come into extensive 
use during the Victorian age. Chosen by the Minister of the 
Department most concerned, the commissions then worked 
independently of control by that Department and remained in 
existence until the work was finished. They exerted consider-
able influence on the course of British history in the are a 
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It gave six causes for the failure of the bank. First it said 
that Act X of 1863 removed many restrictions contained in the 
previous Act and allowed unsafe business transactions. 
Secondly the report stated that the powers given under Act x 
of 1863 had been abused by weak and unprincipled secretaries 
acting under the influence of a designing native director, 
Premchund Roychund. Third, the Presidents and directors in 
the period August 1863 to April 1865 were negligent and 
of colonial practices, parliamentary statutes and social 
legislation. Hugh McDowall Clokie and J. William Robinson, 
Roya! Commissions of Inquiry (Stanford, 1937), and Harold F. 
Gosnell, "British Royal Commissions of Inquiry," Poli tic al 
Science Quarterly, XLIX, pp. 84-118. Some commissions, of 
course, sat for a long time and failing to have a unanimous 
report, issued a minority report. A poem entitled "Pageant o f 
Parl i ament" printed in Punch alluded to such reports, it 
begins: 
I saw an old man in the park; 
I asked the old man why 
He watched the couples after dark; 
He made this strange reply: -
"I am the Royal Commission on kissing, 
Appointed by Gladstone in '74; 
The rest of my colleagues are buried or missing; 
Our minutes were lost in the last Great War. 
But still I'm a Royal Commission 
Which never has made a Report, 
And acutely I feel my position, 
For it must be a crime (or a tort) 
To be such a Royal Commission. 
My task I intend to see through, 
Though I know, as an old politician, 
Not a thing will be done if I do. II 
as quoted in Clokie, ~~- cit., pp. 236-238. 
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failed to do their duty by omitting to pass byelaws, by not 
giving proper supervision to bank affairs and to its secre-
taries, and pa~ticularly by failing to ascertain how the 
business of the bank was being conducted. The Commission 
listed as the fourth cause the exceptional nature of those 
prosperous years which should have led the bank officials 
to exercise more than ordinary vigilance. Fifth, the Presi-
dents and directors were not competent bankers and were 
incapable of managing such an institution as the Bank of 
Bombay in difficult times. The absence of sound legal advice 
d . . th . th f f · l 2 0 an assistance was given as e six cause o ai ure. 
The liquidator's report had been turned in on November 
12, 1868, and according to Stuart's estimate the Bank of 
Bombay had irretrievably lost 1,88,99,331 rupees Cll,889,933) 
This was nearly all the capital of the bank; the few lakhs 
which remained were turned over to the shareholders. Thus 
each ruined shareholder received about one hundred rupees 
for every five hundred rupees (nominal value of each share 
per January, 1867), which had once been quoted at nearly 
3,000 rupees. 
20 Royal Commission Report, Summary, p. 47. 
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The bulk of the money, some 25 lakhs, which had been 
turned over to the shareholders belonged to the balance of 
the Government of India. The Government of India in January 
1868 started a new Bank of Bombay with another 25 lakhs, 
though this new bank agreed to accept the liability for the 
whole 50 lakhs. As may be expected there was much criticism 
for starting up a new bank on the heels of such a disaster. 21 
But the share mania was now over and the economy was making 
a gradual but firm recovery. Much money had flowed into 
Bombay during those prosperous days of the American Civil War 
and much of it had been lost, but some had been applied to 
sound works which now formed the basis for this renewal. 
The impract~bility of the numerous schemes which had been 
I 
launched during the boom period had been demonstrated, and 
the cotton industry which had weathered the crisis was now 
seen to be a stable and profitable industry. 
The New Bank of Bombay, Limited, as the reconstructed 
bank was named, began with a capital fixed at one crore of 
rupees (£1,000,000) divided into 20,000 shares of 500 rupees 
apiece. A p rospectus was issued and subscription was invited 
from the shareholders of the old Bank and the public for the 
first issue of 10,000 shares at par. The limitations in the 
21 Times, February 7, 1868, p. 10. 
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charter of the earlier period were reimposed and under prudent 
management the new bank prospered once again. The Presi-
dency Banks Act of 1876 took over the governing of the new 
Bank of Bombay along with the Presidency Banks of Bengal and 
Madras. The Government thereupon ceased to be a shareholder 
in the bank. In 1921 these three banks were amalgamated as 
the Imperial Bank of India. 
The new bank prospered because it had learned two 
important lessons from the downfall of the Old Bank of Bombay. 
First it learned that certain rules had to be imposed on the 
bank's business and these rules must be strictly followed by 
the board of directors. Secondly the relation between the 
Government of India and the bank was revealed to be unsound 
11 . 1 d' 22 as we as mis ea ing. 
The ascendancy which Premchund Roychund attained in 
the bank could never have been attained but for the defects 
in the constitution of the bank. These defects had arisen 
almost entirely from the dangerous relationship to the State 
which the bank enjoyed. The bank had seemingly been a state 
i nstitution, though everything possible had been done to 
deprive the State of even the smallest effective control. 
The Government had held one-third of the shares of the bank, 
they appointed one-third of the directors, they banked with 
22 Economist, July 3, 1869, pp. 773-774. 
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it exclusively, they twice stepped forward to save it from 
ruin by promising advances from the Treasury, and most of 
all they appeared to assume an almost direct responsibility 
by passing the Legislative Act (Act X of 1863) defining its 
operation. The public and the shareholders observing this, 
naturally looked upon the bank as a State department certain 
to be safe and requiring little attention on their part. 
Thus little attention was paid to the directors who became a 
self-renewing body, and who studiously neglected to fulfill 
their duty to the Bank. 
But the Government's liability for the bank was 
absolutely illusory. The Government owned shares exactly as 
the other shareholders owned them. The charter (Act X of 
1863) on which the bank operated had been drawn up by the 
directors of the bank and it contained clauses neither in-
tended or known of by the Government, one of which (granting 
advances on personal security) ultimately destroyed the bank. 
The entire legal constitution of the bank had thus 
been altered by the bank's officers who seemingly acted under 
the Government which had accepted their charter without any 
inquiry or alteration. The powers to lend money were supposed 
to be regulated by the board of directors on which the 
Government directors sat. But these Government directors 
were outnumbered two to one and furthermore they were· 
111 
officials who previously had had no acquaintance with banking. 
Everyone eventually lost from such an arrangement: the 
Government, because it felt duty bound to support the bank in 
time of danger, and the shareholders, who believed that the 
bank could not fail since the State was watching over it. 
The new Bank of Bombay, Limited, however, was much the better 
for the lessons learned and was able to avoid the path to 
failure experienced by its predecessor. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The blockade of the southern American ports during the 
American Civil War caused the textile industry of England to 
look elsewhere for cotton supplies . They found at Bombay 
an enterprising group of merchants who, at the prospect of 
large monetary rewards, eagerly attempted to fill a large 
portion of Lancashire's demands. The subsequent flow of 
funds into Bombay had a great impact upon the small island. 
Its economy, which previously had been governed by the 
monsoon season , now made its first large-scale contact with 
world trade. Up to this time Indian cotton had mostly been 
ignored due to its poor quality and the uncertain delivery 
schedules caused by the lack of internal communications and 
long voyages around Africa. The sudden and real demand for 
cotton during the Civil War caused these prob l ems to be 
partly surmounted or discounted. Sir Bartle Frere, the 
Governor of Bombay , introduced legislation to raise the 
standard of Indian cotton and prevent adulteration to the 
bales. The subsequently passed Cotton Frauds Act helped 
realize Frere ' s aim. Railroad lines were built and communi-
cations with the cotton growing districts were speeded up. 
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The cotton growing districts of India certainly bene-
fited from the demand for their crop, but the island of Bombay 
felt the largest impact of the times. Being an island, its 
position was peculiar. Already crowded, the island experi-
enced a large influx of people who wished to share the wealth 
being accumulated there. Frere, characterized by many, in-
cluding Lord Lawrence, as too free a spender of Government 
funds, launched upon a massive reconstruction effort in the 
city. Older portions of the town including the fort were 
leveled and new Government buildings and housing areas 
erected. But this was not sufficient to meet the needs of 
the growing population and commerci a l activities. Thus the 
notorious land reclamation companies which grew up during 
this period were really an obvious outgrowth of the situation. 
They were for the most part based on a sound need--they were 
designed to fulfill port and warehouse demands as well as 
living areas. Unfortunately, once the large amounts of money 
flowing into Bombay could no longer find sound investments, 
the reclamation companies fell into the hands of speculators 
and their shares began to sell for prices inconsistent with 
good business judgement. And so when the cotton market 
collapsed, the recl amation companies received the death-blow 
as well, since the capital which backed them had been care-
lessly placed in unsound financial companies. 
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The sudden wealth caused by the cotton sales led to 
the growth a n d expansion of unsound financial companies. 
Just as the reclamation companies grew out of a need for 
increased land, the financial companies too fulfilled the 
need for a place of investment for the profits of the cotton 
trade. The Bank of Bombay figured prominently in the rise of 
these institutions by lending them large sums of money. Some 
of the Bank of Bombay's directors and officials were dishonest 
men out to make fortunes in the speculative market, others 
were simp l y lazy victims of their own lack of knowledge of 
sound banking procedures. The Government of India still, 
suffering the effects of the Mutiny, was weak and unfortunately 
followed to some extent a laissez-faire attitude towards the 
economic activity. During the height of the boom period, many 
Government officials resigned and returned to England because 
the cost of living had risen to such a degree that the civil 
servants' salaries barely covered living expenses. Others 
quit to join the staffs of the newly founded bubble enter-
prises. With fewer men to govern such an expanding community, 
Frere cannot unconditionally be blamed for the e conomic disaster 
which fol l owed the termination of the American Civil War. 
Frere tried vigilantly under q uestioning by the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry to vindicate his part in the calamity. 
Certainly he deserves partial blame for what happened, but 
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perhaps such strong words as "supineness and inaction" which 
one of the Commissioners used to characterize his actions 
should not have been uttered. Frere had previously served as 
a Government official in Calcutta and had welcomed the post 
of Governor of Bombay. He meant well; he hoped to transform 
Bombay into a prosperous, beautiful city. He worked hard and 
long and suffered many illnesses and separations from his 
family. Unfortunately he lacked discretion and spent too 
much money for building projects at just the wrong time, and 
promoted the reclamations and growth of cotton, while not 
watching the financial side of the city with adequate caution. 
Even when prompted by Sir Charles Wood to look into the affairs 
of the Bank of Bombay, Frere was too sanguine in his belief 
that the Bank would somehow work things out on its own. Then 
too his hostility with Calcutta over the Government of India' s 
criticism of his liberal spending policies, and their powers 
to check his acts led him to ignore repeated requests by 
Lawrence for information regarding the Bank of Bombay. It 
is doubtful however that even if their warnings which came 
after considerable damage had already been done had been 
heeded, that the Bank could have survived the massive failures 
which befell men and companies in Bombay. 
In the long run Bombay was better as a result of the 
economic disaster. Frere's building projects created a n~w, 
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forward looking city--rnodern day Bombay dates from his gover-
norship. The demand for cotton had given an impetus to 
improve the quality of Indian cotton and had forced an improve-
rnent of communications with the interior of India. Some of 
the money which the cotton trade had brought into Bombay 
went to good use; cotton mills were built, old portions of 
the city were renovated and public works and government 
buildings considerably improved. In addition the Lancashire 
manufacturers found that trade with India had enhanced the 
quality of the Indian staple and thus helped their industry. 
They formerly had feared the Indian mills as competition but 
now realized that the cotton mills in Bombay were not a 
threat to their business. When the cris i s was over the Born-
bay merchants and cotton spinners found they had a good base 
for the future, and this industry has thrived up to the 
present time. 
Surely the speculative mania had its disruptive 
effects, but both Indian and Englishmen suffered e crually. 
Kipling's maxim of a later decade that, "East is east, and 
west is west and never the twain shall rneet," 1 proved 






Kipling, "The Ballad of East and West" 
Literature (ed. Spencer, Houghton, Barrows), 
19 5 2) , pp. 8 7 2- 8 7 4. 
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Englishmen had invested in and organized the speculative 
schemes, so neither could be condemned entirely for misjudg-
ment. Thus both could start afresh with no injurious burden 
of blame. Even Premchund Roychund suffered no recriminations 
for his part in the mania--and amassed yet another fortune 
before his death in the early 1900's. A lesson had been 
learned from the disaster and Indians as well as Englishmen 
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